Xavier Vives
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732653 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Xavier Vives |
| GIVEN NAMES | Xavier |
| FAMILY NAME | Vives |
| SIGNATURE | VIVES X |
| AFFILIATIONS | IESE Business School |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9110-9850 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
La escritura creativa y el pensamiento crítico en los grados de Educación Infantil y Primaria de cinco universidades españolas
Los déficits de escritura en el alumnado universitario que recibe formación para convertirse en futuros docentes demuestran la necesidad de trabajar la competencia escrita y el razonamiento crítico. El objetivo general de la presente investigación es realizar un análisis de las palabras clave relacionadas con el pensamiento crítico y la escritura creativa en los planes docentes de los Grados de Educación Infantil y Primaria de cinco universidades…
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while they increase R&D but decrease output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope fo…
Information and Learning in Markets
Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives
A version of the herding prediction model with a rational-expectations flavor is reexamined in the light of incentive theory. The welfare loss at the market solution with respect to the incentive-efficient solution can be decomposed into an information externality term minus an incentive cost term. It is found that the inefficiency of herding at the market solution is low when the cost of providing incentives is high. When the cost of providing i…
Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation
Journal Article Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation Get access Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation. Edited by Mayer (Colin) and Vives (Xavier). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. xx + 357. £29.95 hardback, US $54.95 hardback. ISBN 0 521 44397 0.) David Cobham David Cobham University of St Andrews Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 104,…
Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon
A standard demand-deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).
Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation
Journal Article Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation Get access Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation. Edited by Mayer (Colin) and Vives (Xavier). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. xx + 357. £29.95 hardback, US $54.95 hardback. ISBN 0 521 44397 0.) David Cobham David Cobham University of St Andrews Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 104,…
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while they increase R&D but decrease output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope fo…
Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon
A standard demand-deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).
Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon
A standard demand-deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press
Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation
Journal Article Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation Get access Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation. Edited by Mayer (Colin) and Vives (Xavier). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. xx + 357. £29.95 hardback, US $54.95 hardback. ISBN 0 521 44397 0.) David Cobham David Cobham University of St Andrews Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 104,…
Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives
A version of the herding prediction model with a rational-expectations flavor is reexamined in the light of incentive theory. The welfare loss at the market solution with respect to the incentive-efficient solution can be decomposed into an information externality term minus an incentive cost term. It is found that the inefficiency of herding at the market solution is low when the cost of providing incentives is high. When the cost of providing i…
Information and Learning in Markets
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while they increase R&D but decrease output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope fo…
La escritura creativa y el pensamiento crítico en los grados de Educación Infantil y Primaria de cinco universidades españolas
Los déficits de escritura en el alumnado universitario que recibe formación para convertirse en futuros docentes demuestran la necesidad de trabajar la competencia escrita y el razonamiento crítico. El objetivo general de la presente investigación es realizar un análisis de las palabras clave relacionadas con el pensamiento crítico y la escritura creativa en los planes docentes de los Grados de Educación Infantil y Primaria de cinco universidades…
Economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Art (2 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Cournot competition (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Housing Market and Economics (2 works)