Jerry R Green
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732890 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jerry R Green |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jerry R |
| FAMILY NAME | Green |
| SIGNATURE | GREEN J R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Harvard University Press |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 53 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1978 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation Principle is valid
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown that, in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts dominates u…
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade. Essays in Honour of Lionel McKenzie
Journal Article General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade Get access General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade. Essays in Honour of Lionel McKenzie. Edited by Jerry R. Green and Jose Alexandre Sheinkman. (New York: Academic Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 401. $39.50.) Howard C. Petith Howard C. Petith University College, Swansea Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 360, 1 December 1980, Pa…
Optimal Capital-Gains Taxation under Limited Information
Taxation of capital gains at realization may distort individuals' decisions regarding holding or selling during an asset's lifetime. This creates the problem of designing a tax structure for capital gains so as to induce efficient patterns of holding an selling. Several tax structures are explored in this paper. Linear taxation, at rates which rise with the holding period, can achieve the first best, even under the conditions of limited informati…
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown that, in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts dominates u…
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
Optimal Capital-Gains Taxation under Limited Information
Taxation of capital gains at realization may distort individuals' decisions regarding holding or selling during an asset's lifetime. This creates the problem of designing a tax structure for capital gains so as to induce efficient patterns of holding an selling. Several tax structures are explored in this paper. Linear taxation, at rates which rise with the holding period, can achieve the first best, even under the conditions of limited informati…
Optimal Capital-Gains Taxation under Limited Information
Taxation of capital gains at realization may distort individuals' decisions regarding holding or selling during an asset's lifetime. This creates the problem of designing a tax structure for capital gains so as to induce efficient patterns of holding an selling. Several tax structures are explored in this paper. Linear taxation, at rates which rise with the holding period, can achieve the first best, even under the conditions of limited informati…
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade. Essays in Honour of Lionel McKenzie
Journal Article General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade Get access General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade. Essays in Honour of Lionel McKenzie. Edited by Jerry R. Green and Jose Alexandre Sheinkman. (New York: Academic Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 401. $39.50.) Howard C. Petith Howard C. Petith University College, Swansea Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 360, 1 December 1980, Pa…
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown that, in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts dominates u…
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation Principle is valid
Economics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Political science (2 works)