Wieland Müller
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732987 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Wieland Müller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Wieland |
| FAMILY NAME | Müller |
| SIGNATURE | MULLER W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tilburg University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0353-2486 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1954 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Microtargeting and voters’ unawareness
Due to technological innovation, political interest groups sending messages via news platforms have the ability to (i) microtarget news based on individual-level voter data and (ii) obfuscate their identities, which can be exploited to spread disinformation. We experimentally study the implementation of two proposed interventions in the laboratory, aiming to prevent election manipulation by disinformation in various media environments. We find th…
Though This Be Madness, Yet There is Method In't
Much like Wagner himself, the eponymous hero of Tannhäuser treads a path of stark contrasts and \nrapid swings. From Wartburg to the Venusberg and to the Vatican, the gifted bard transforms from \nself-centered artist to seduced disciple, disillusioned devotee, hopeful lover, self-loathing pilgrim and \nfinally redeemed martyr. He tries everything and everything is trying. These contrasts reach a peak in \nthe opera‟s central episode, the song co…
The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control treatments, we provide an explanation for these result…
Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (OSBORNE [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the …
Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability
Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate the rival's behavior correctly.
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare‐improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions …
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Merger and Collusion in Contests
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.
Strategies, heuristics, and the relevance of risk-aversion in a dynamic decision problem
Stackelberg Beats Cournot
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matchi…
The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital
The following article provides a synopsis of different versions of the revisionist theory of the state, and of its immanent tendencies. Further, it outlines a critique of the establishment of income distribution as an autonomous sphere, independent of production, and of the way state socialism is presented as carrying out its specific functions, as Marx indicated by means of the Factory Legislation. Only on the basis of these preliminary consider…
The Colonial Police and Their Forensic Problems
The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital
The following article provides a synopsis of different versions of the revisionist theory of the state, and of its immanent tendencies. Further, it outlines a critique of the establishment of income distribution as an autonomous sphere, independent of production, and of the way state socialism is presented as carrying out its specific functions, as Marx indicated by means of the Factory Legislation. Only on the basis of these preliminary consider…
Stackelberg Beats Cournot
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matchi…
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare‐improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions …
The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control treatments, we provide an explanation for these result…
Strategies, heuristics, and the relevance of risk-aversion in a dynamic decision problem
The Colonial Police and Their Forensic Problems
The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital
The following article provides a synopsis of different versions of the revisionist theory of the state, and of its immanent tendencies. Further, it outlines a critique of the establishment of income distribution as an autonomous sphere, independent of production, and of the way state socialism is presented as carrying out its specific functions, as Marx indicated by means of the Factory Legislation. Only on the basis of these preliminary consider…
Strategies, heuristics, and the relevance of risk-aversion in a dynamic decision problem
Stackelberg Beats Cournot
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matchi…
Merger and Collusion in Contests
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare‐improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions …
Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability
Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate the rival's behavior correctly.
Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (OSBORNE [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the …
The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control treatments, we provide an explanation for these result…
Though This Be Madness, Yet There is Method In't
Much like Wagner himself, the eponymous hero of Tannhäuser treads a path of stark contrasts and \nrapid swings. From Wartburg to the Venusberg and to the Vatican, the gifted bard transforms from \nself-centered artist to seduced disciple, disillusioned devotee, hopeful lover, self-loathing pilgrim and \nfinally redeemed martyr. He tries everything and everything is trying. These contrasts reach a peak in \nthe opera‟s central episode, the song co…
Microtargeting and voters’ unawareness
Due to technological innovation, political interest groups sending messages via news platforms have the ability to (i) microtarget news based on individual-level voter data and (ii) obfuscate their identities, which can be exploited to spread disinformation. We experimentally study the implementation of two proposed interventions in the laboratory, aiming to prevent election manipulation by disinformation in various media environments. We find th…
Economics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Collusion (3 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · History (3 works)