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Anke S Kessler

Biographic Data

ID5733124
NAMEAnke S Kessler
GIVEN NAMESAnke S
FAMILY NAMEKessler
SIGNATUREKESSLER A S
AFFILIATIONSCenter for Economic and Policy Research
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS13
WORKS AS AUTHOR5
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2001
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
H-INDEX2
  • The Theory of Human Capital Revisited

    Open Access•Anke S Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2006•Cited by: 6•References: 34

    Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. Becker (1964) argues that employers will only invest in specific training, not general training, when labour markets are competitive. The article reconsiders Becker's theory. Using essentially his framework, we show that there exists an "incentive" complementarity between employer-sponsored general and specific training: the possibility to provide speci…

  • Representative versus direct democracy

    Open Access•Anke S Kessler•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 7•References: 17

  • Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships

    Anke S Kessler•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2004

    This paper studies a principal-agent model with third-party auditing. Auditing technologies are distinguished according to the quantity (frequency) and the quality (accuracy) of the information they deliver. We show that the frequency of audits is irrelevant if the auditor either is honest or colludes with the agent but auditing evidence can only be concealed and not forged. Only if auditing evidence can be falsified does the principal benefit bo…

  • Monitoring and Productive Efficiency in Public and Private Firms

    Anke S Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2002

    The paper compares productive efficiency in public and private firms. We study a principal-agent model in which the firm's manager is privately informed about a cost parameter and exerts unobservable cost reducing effort, while the owner can conduct costly audits to obtain information about the firm's cost. Without auditing, managerial effort (and therefore production efficiency) is strictly higher under public governance with a benevolent govern…

  • (Non-)Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models

    Open Access•Nico A Hansen, Anke S Kessler•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2001•References: 23

  • Representative versus direct democracy

    Open Access•Anke S Kessler•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 7•References: 17

  • The Theory of Human Capital Revisited

    Open Access•Anke S Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2006•Cited by: 6•References: 34

    Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. Becker (1964) argues that employers will only invest in specific training, not general training, when labour markets are competitive. The article reconsiders Becker's theory. Using essentially his framework, we show that there exists an "incentive" complementarity between employer-sponsored general and specific training: the possibility to provide speci…

  • (Non-)Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models

    Open Access•Nico A Hansen, Anke S Kessler•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2001•References: 23

  • Monitoring and Productive Efficiency in Public and Private Firms

    Anke S Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2002

    The paper compares productive efficiency in public and private firms. We study a principal-agent model in which the firm's manager is privately informed about a cost parameter and exerts unobservable cost reducing effort, while the owner can conduct costly audits to obtain information about the firm's cost. Without auditing, managerial effort (and therefore production efficiency) is strictly higher under public governance with a benevolent govern…

  • Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships

    Anke S Kessler•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2004

    This paper studies a principal-agent model with third-party auditing. Auditing technologies are distinguished according to the quantity (frequency) and the quality (accuracy) of the information they deliver. We show that the frequency of audits is irrelevant if the auditor either is honest or colludes with the agent but auditing evidence can only be concealed and not forged. Only if auditing evidence can be falsified does the principal benefit bo…

  • Representative versus direct democracy

    Open Access•Anke S Kessler•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 7•References: 17

  • The Theory of Human Capital Revisited

    Open Access•Anke S Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2006•Cited by: 6•References: 34

    Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. Becker (1964) argues that employers will only invest in specific training, not general training, when labour markets are competitive. The article reconsiders Becker's theory. Using essentially his framework, we show that there exists an "incentive" complementarity between employer-sponsored general and specific training: the possibility to provide speci…

Economics (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (2 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (2 works) · Accounting (1 work) · Audit (1 work)

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