Guido Friebel

Biographic Data

ID5733957
NAMEGuido Friebel
GIVEN NAMESGuido
FAMILY NAMEFriebel
SIGNATUREFRIEBEL G
AFFILIATIONSGoethe University Frankfurt
ORCID0000-0003-1560-9962
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS13
TOTAL CITATIONS14
WORKS AS AUTHOR13
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2005
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX2

  • A Pay Change and Its Long-Term Consequences

    Miriam Krueger, Guido FriebelARTICLEJournal of Labor Economics2022

    In a professional services firm, top management unexpectedly adjusted the pay of consultants in some divisions to the pay in other divisions. In this quasi experiment, fixed wages increased and bonuses decreased, reducing pay for the high performers and increasing it for the low performers. Individual outputs and efforts decreased by 30%, and attrition and absenteeism increased. The effects were driven by those who were rationally expecting to lo…

  • What Do Employee Referral Programs Do? Measuring the Direct and Overall Effects of a Management Practice

    Guido Friebel, Matthias Heinz et al.ARTICLEJournal of Political Economy2022Cited by: 1References: 10

    Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. On direct effects, larger referral bonuses increase referral quantity but decrease quality, though the increase in referrals from ERPs is modest. However, the overall effect of having an ERP is substantial, reducing attrition by 15% and significantly decreasing labor costs. This occurs, partly, because referrals stay longer than nonreferrals, but, mainly, from indirect …

  • Crime and Education in a Model of Information Transmission

    Open AccessDarwin Cortés, Guido Friebel et al.ARTICLEAnnals of Public and Cooperative…2019References: 6

    We model the decisions of young individuals to stay in school or drop out and engage in criminal activities. We build on the literature on human capital and crime engagement and use the framework of Banerjee (1993) that assumes that the information needed to engage in crime arrives in the form of a rumour and that individuals update their beliefs about the profitability of crime relative to education. These assumptions allow us to study the effec…

  • Is it Always Good to Let Universities Select Their Students

    Guido Friebel, Dario MaldonadoARTICLERevue économique2015References: 4

    Inspiré par les tendances récentes du système universitaire en Europe, nous étudions des réformes partielles donnant aux universités le droit de sélectionner leurs étudiants mais pas le droit de percevoir des frais de scolarité. Donner aux universités le droit de sélectionner leurs étudiants devrait augmenter la productivité des étudiants sur le marché du travail car l’appariement du capital humain des enseignants et des étudiants serait meilleur…

  • The Schubert Effect

    Open AccessGuido Friebel, Jibirila Leinyuy et al.ARTICLEWorld Development2014References: 10

  • Parental leave — A policy evaluation of the Swedish “Daddy-Month” reform

    Open AccessJohn Ekberg, Rickard Eriksson et al.ARTICLEJournal of Public Economics2013

  • Xenophobic attacks, migration intentions, and networks

    Open AccessGuido Friebel, Juan M Gallego et al.ARTICLEJournal of Population Economics2012Cited by: 8References: 5

  • Do women have longer conversations? Telephone evidence of gendered communication strategies

    Open AccessGuido Friebel, P SeabrightARTICLEJournal of Economic Psychology2011Cited by: 3References: 16

  • Is it Always Good to Let Universities Select Their Students

    Open AccessGuido Friebel, Diego Maldonado et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2011

  • Railway (De)Regulation

    Open AccessGuido Friebel, MARC IVALDI et al.ARTICLEEconomica2010References: 15

    We estimate the effects of reforms on railroad efficiency in Europe by using a new panel data set that covers most EU countries over a period of more than 20 years. A production frontier model finds that efficiency increases when reforms such as third‐party network access, introduction of an independent regulator, and vertical separation are implemented. However, the reform effects depend on sequencing: introduction of multiple reforms in a packa…

  • Fighting for Talent

    Open AccessGuido Friebel, Mariassunta GiannettiARTICLEThe Economic Journal2009Cited by: 2References: 37

    We show that access to finance may affect firms through the labour market. Talented workers want to realise their ideas but also seek insurance against income risk. Large firms default less often than small firms but they investigate more thoroughly and reject more good ideas. With easier access to consumer credit, talented workers become less averse to the income risk of working in small firms. Thus, small firms gain an advantage on the labour m…

  • Smuggling Humans

    Open AccessGuido Friebel, Sergei GurievARTICLEJournal of the European Economic…2006

    We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Interme-diaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are more easily en-forceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because of stricter…

  • Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments

    Guido Friebel, Sergei GurievBOOK2005

    External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacle to…