Josse Delfgaauw
Biographic Data
| ID | 5734131 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Josse Delfgaauw |
| GIVEN NAMES | Josse |
| FAMILY NAME | Delfgaauw |
| SIGNATURE | DELFGAAUW J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8450-7989 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Team incentives, task assignment, and performance
Public sector employees
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public s…
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public s…
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public s…
Public sector employees
Team incentives, task assignment, and performance
Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Labour economics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Public sector (2 works)