Zacharias Sautner
Biographic Data
| ID | 5734341 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Zacharias Sautner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Zacharias |
| FAMILY NAME | Sautner |
| SIGNATURE | SAUTNER Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | Frankfurt School of Finance & Management |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0780-6571 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Lawyer Expertise and Contract Design—Evidence from M&A Negotiations
We argue that the relative expertise of contracting parties strongly affects contractual outcomes. Using unique data on company acquisition contracts, we document that lawyers with higher expertise relative to their counterparties negotiate better risk allocation for their clients and more favourable target prices. The benefits of high expertise outweigh its costs, largely because high-expertise lawyers economise on transaction costs by shortenin…
The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors
According to our survey about climate risk perceptions, institutional investors believe climate risks have financial implications for their portfolio firms and that these risks, particularly regulatory risks, already have begun to materialize. Many of the investors, especially the long-term, larger, and ESG-oriented ones, consider risk management and engagement, rather than divestment, to be the better approach for addressing climate risks. Altho…
Contracting between Firms
We analyze contracts between a large buyer and her suppliers. We find that contracts with critical product suppliers contain more clauses that address moral hazard, primarily through monitoring. If holdup concerns are larger, there are more contractual protections against it. Over time, contracts with the same supplier include additional provisions that address moral hazard through monitoring. This dynamic effect is strongest for service contract…
No prominent works on this page.
Contracting between Firms
We analyze contracts between a large buyer and her suppliers. We find that contracts with critical product suppliers contain more clauses that address moral hazard, primarily through monitoring. If holdup concerns are larger, there are more contractual protections against it. Over time, contracts with the same supplier include additional provisions that address moral hazard through monitoring. This dynamic effect is strongest for service contract…
The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors
According to our survey about climate risk perceptions, institutional investors believe climate risks have financial implications for their portfolio firms and that these risks, particularly regulatory risks, already have begun to materialize. Many of the investors, especially the long-term, larger, and ESG-oriented ones, consider risk management and engagement, rather than divestment, to be the better approach for addressing climate risks. Altho…
Lawyer Expertise and Contract Design—Evidence from M&A Negotiations
We argue that the relative expertise of contracting parties strongly affects contractual outcomes. Using unique data on company acquisition contracts, we document that lawyers with higher expertise relative to their counterparties negotiate better risk allocation for their clients and more favourable target prices. The benefits of high expertise outweigh its costs, largely because high-expertise lawyers economise on transaction costs by shortenin…
Business (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Industrial organization (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance (1 work)