Patrick W Schmitz
Biographic Data
| ID | 5734412 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Patrick W Schmitz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Patrick W |
| FAMILY NAME | Schmitz |
| SIGNATURE | SCHMITZ P W |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cologne |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3461-5102 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services
A buyer wants to purchase an innovative good from a seller. Both parties are risk-neutral, and payments from the buyer to the seller must be non-negative. After the contract is signed, the seller privately observes a signal which may be informative about the seller’s costs. We compare two contracting regimes. In the case of specific performance, the courts enforce the contractually specified trade level. In the case of at-will contracting, the se…
Cooling Off in Negotiations
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling off reduces the rejec…
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation
The fact that, according to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold‐up problem, which occurs if non‐verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade t…
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility l…
Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Applications
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts
In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that partial privatization may well be the optimal ownership structure. While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is usually suboptimal, it is shown here that joint ownership in the form of partial privatization can be optimal since it mitigates the disadvantages of public owne…
Randomization in coalition contracts
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility l…
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation
The fact that, according to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold‐up problem, which occurs if non‐verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade t…
Randomization in coalition contracts
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts
In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that partial privatization may well be the optimal ownership structure. While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is usually suboptimal, it is shown here that joint ownership in the form of partial privatization can be optimal since it mitigates the disadvantages of public owne…
Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Applications
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation
The fact that, according to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold‐up problem, which occurs if non‐verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade t…
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility l…
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases
Cooling Off in Negotiations
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling off reduces the rejec…
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services
A buyer wants to purchase an innovative good from a seller. Both parties are risk-neutral, and payments from the buyer to the seller must be non-negative. After the contract is signed, the seller privately observes a signal which may be informative about the seller’s costs. We compare two contracting regimes. In the case of specific performance, the courts enforce the contractually specified trade level. In the case of at-will contracting, the se…
Economics (8 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works)