Ronald Bosman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5734902 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ronald Bosman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ronald |
| FAMILY NAME | Bosman |
| SIGNATURE | BOSMAN R |
| AFFILIATIONS | De Nederlandsche Bank |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 49 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Global Risk, Investment and Emotions
We investigate a novel dynamic choice problem in an experiment where emotions are measured through self‐reports. The choice problem concerns the investment of an amount of money in a safe option and a risky option when there is a ‘global risk’ of losing all earnings, from both options, including any return from the risky option. Our key finding is that global risk can reduce the amount invested in the risky option. This result cannot be explained…
The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game
Emotional Hazard in a Power‐to‐Take Experiment
In this experimental study of a two player power-to-take game, players earn an income in an individual effort task preceding the game. The game has two stages. First, one player can claim any part of the other s income take rate. Then, the latter player can respond by destroying own income. We focus on how emotions influence responses and show:1 a higher take rate increases (decreases) intensity of negative (positive) emotions;2 negative emotions…
Emotional Hazard in a Power‐to‐Take Experiment
In this experimental study of a two player power-to-take game, players earn an income in an individual effort task preceding the game. The game has two stages. First, one player can claim any part of the other s income take rate. Then, the latter player can respond by destroying own income. We focus on how emotions influence responses and show:1 a higher take rate increases (decreases) intensity of negative (positive) emotions;2 negative emotions…
The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game
Global Risk, Investment and Emotions
We investigate a novel dynamic choice problem in an experiment where emotions are measured through self‐reports. The choice problem concerns the investment of an amount of money in a safe option and a risky option when there is a ‘global risk’ of losing all earnings, from both options, including any return from the risky option. Our key finding is that global risk can reduce the amount invested in the risky option. This result cannot be explained…
Emotional Hazard in a Power‐to‐Take Experiment
In this experimental study of a two player power-to-take game, players earn an income in an individual effort task preceding the game. The game has two stages. First, one player can claim any part of the other s income take rate. Then, the latter player can respond by destroying own income. We focus on how emotions influence responses and show:1 a higher take rate increases (decreases) intensity of negative (positive) emotions;2 negative emotions…
The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game
Global Risk, Investment and Emotions
We investigate a novel dynamic choice problem in an experiment where emotions are measured through self‐reports. The choice problem concerns the investment of an amount of money in a safe option and a risky option when there is a ‘global risk’ of losing all earnings, from both options, including any return from the risky option. Our key finding is that global risk can reduce the amount invested in the risky option. This result cannot be explained…
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Earnings (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Power (physics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works)