Georg Kirchsteiger
Biographic Data
| ID | 5735283 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Georg Kirchsteiger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Georg |
| FAMILY NAME | Kirchsteiger |
| SIGNATURE | KIRCHSTEIGER G |
| AFFILIATIONS | ECARES, Universite Libre de Bruxelles |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Assignment Procedure Biases In Randomised Policy Experiments
Randomised controlled trials (RCT) have gained ground as the dominant tool for studying policy interventions in many fields of applied economics. We analyse theoretically encouragement and resentful demoralisation in RCTs and show that these might be rooted in the same behavioural trait – people's propensity to act reciprocally. When people are motivated by reciprocity, the choice of assignment procedure influences the RCTs’ findings. We show tha…
On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox
We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether 'Walrasian' platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one s…
Learning to Like What You Have – Explaining the Endowment Effect
The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a g…
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
FLWNO
Insider Power, Wage Discrimination and Fairness
The exercise of insider power is frequently considered as a major cause of involuntary unemployment. We show that under standard assumptions - insiders are selfish and they need not fear the loss of their job - insider power does not guarantee unemployment but the introduction of a market clearing two-tier system. Yet, while insider power is a common phenomen two-tier systems are rarely observed. We show that if outsiders exhibit a preference for…
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
This paper reports the results of an experiment that was designed to test the impact of fairness on market prices. Prices were determined in a one-sided oral auction, with buyers as price-makers. Upon acceptance of an offer, sellers determined the quality of the good. Buyers offered prices that were substantially above the market-clearing level and expected sellers to respond with high quality levels. This expectation was, on average, confirmed b…
Learning to Like What You Have – Explaining the Endowment Effect
The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a g…
Assignment Procedure Biases In Randomised Policy Experiments
Randomised controlled trials (RCT) have gained ground as the dominant tool for studying policy interventions in many fields of applied economics. We analyse theoretically encouragement and resentful demoralisation in RCTs and show that these might be rooted in the same behavioural trait – people's propensity to act reciprocally. When people are motivated by reciprocity, the choice of assignment procedure influences the RCTs’ findings. We show tha…
On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox
We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether 'Walrasian' platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one s…
Insider Power, Wage Discrimination and Fairness
The exercise of insider power is frequently considered as a major cause of involuntary unemployment. We show that under standard assumptions - insiders are selfish and they need not fear the loss of their job - insider power does not guarantee unemployment but the introduction of a market clearing two-tier system. Yet, while insider power is a common phenomen two-tier systems are rarely observed. We show that if outsiders exhibit a preference for…
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
This paper reports the results of an experiment that was designed to test the impact of fairness on market prices. Prices were determined in a one-sided oral auction, with buyers as price-makers. Upon acceptance of an offer, sellers determined the quality of the good. Buyers offered prices that were substantially above the market-clearing level and expected sellers to respond with high quality levels. This expectation was, on average, confirmed b…
Insider Power, Wage Discrimination and Fairness
The exercise of insider power is frequently considered as a major cause of involuntary unemployment. We show that under standard assumptions - insiders are selfish and they need not fear the loss of their job - insider power does not guarantee unemployment but the introduction of a market clearing two-tier system. Yet, while insider power is a common phenomen two-tier systems are rarely observed. We show that if outsiders exhibit a preference for…
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
FLWNO
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Learning to Like What You Have – Explaining the Endowment Effect
The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a g…
On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox
We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether 'Walrasian' platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one s…
Assignment Procedure Biases In Randomised Policy Experiments
Randomised controlled trials (RCT) have gained ground as the dominant tool for studying policy interventions in many fields of applied economics. We analyse theoretically encouragement and resentful demoralisation in RCTs and show that these might be rooted in the same behavioural trait – people's propensity to act reciprocally. When people are motivated by reciprocity, the choice of assignment procedure influences the RCTs’ findings. We show tha…
Economics (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Clearing (2 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works)