Natalia Fabra
Biographic Data
| ID | 5735672 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Natalia Fabra |
| GIVEN NAMES | Natalia |
| FAMILY NAME | Fabra |
| SIGNATURE | FABRA N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2579-599X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Auctions with Privately Known Capacities
We study a multi-unit auction model in which bidders are privately informed about the maximum number of units they are willing to trade (which we refer to as ‘capacity’). No matter how big or small, private information on capacities changes the nature of the equilibrium as compared to when private information is on costs (or valuations). Also, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions are not revenue equivalent, in contrast to when costs are …
Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement
An imperfectly informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she optimally procure these units? Should she run technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies? Should she instead post separate prices for eac…
Market Design and Investment Incentives
The purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform‐price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price caps and (iii) bid duration. We find tha…
Market Design and Investment Incentives
The purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform‐price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price caps and (iii) bid duration. We find tha…
Market Design and Investment Incentives
The purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform‐price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price caps and (iii) bid duration. We find tha…
Auctions with Privately Known Capacities
We study a multi-unit auction model in which bidders are privately informed about the maximum number of units they are willing to trade (which we refer to as ‘capacity’). No matter how big or small, private information on capacities changes the nature of the equilibrium as compared to when private information is on costs (or valuations). Also, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions are not revenue equivalent, in contrast to when costs are …
Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement
An imperfectly informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she optimally procure these units? Should she run technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies? Should she instead post separate prices for eac…
Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Business (3 works) · Common value auction (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Ex-ante (2 works) · Industrial organization (2 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (2 works) · Monetary economics (2 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (1 work)