Nils‐Henrik M von der Fehr
Biographic Data
| ID | 5735673 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nils‐Henrik M von der Fehr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nils‐Henrik M |
| FAMILY NAME | von der Fehr |
| SIGNATURE | VON DER FEHR N H M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Market Design and Investment Incentives
The purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform‐price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price caps and (iii) bid duration. We find tha…
Regulation with wage bargaining
In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent‐sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend …
Coase versus Pacman
In standard durable-goods monopoly models, both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua. If the set of buyers is finite, the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient. Introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the Coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers. A folk theorem is obta…
Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry
Journal Article Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry Get access Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr University of Oslo Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar David Harbord David Harbord London Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 103, Issue 418, 1 May 1993, Pages 531–546, https://doi.org/10.2307…
Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry
Journal Article Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry Get access Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr University of Oslo Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar David Harbord David Harbord London Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 103, Issue 418, 1 May 1993, Pages 531–546, https://doi.org/10.2307…
Coase versus Pacman
In standard durable-goods monopoly models, both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua. If the set of buyers is finite, the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient. Introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the Coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers. A folk theorem is obta…
Market Design and Investment Incentives
The purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform‐price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price caps and (iii) bid duration. We find tha…
Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry
Journal Article Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry Get access Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr University of Oslo Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar David Harbord David Harbord London Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 103, Issue 418, 1 May 1993, Pages 531–546, https://doi.org/10.2307…
Coase versus Pacman
In standard durable-goods monopoly models, both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua. If the set of buyers is finite, the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient. Introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the Coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers. A folk theorem is obta…
Regulation with wage bargaining
In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent‐sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend …
Market Design and Investment Incentives
The purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform‐price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price caps and (iii) bid duration. We find tha…
Economics (4 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Bargaining power (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Business Strategy and Innovation (1 works) · Coase theorem (1 works) · Collective bargaining (1 works)