Steven A Matthews
Biographic Data
| ID | 5736003 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Steven A Matthews |
| GIVEN NAMES | Steven A |
| FAMILY NAME | Matthews |
| SIGNATURE | MATTHEWS S A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1979 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Low Reserve Prices in Auctions
A standard result in auction theory is that a seller’s profit-maximising reserve price is no less than his own value for the good. In practice, however, reserve prices often appear to be less than sellers’ values. This article revisits the theory of optimal reserves in the context of second-price auctions. The main result is that an optimal reserve is less than the seller’s value if the bidders are sufficiently risk averse and if their values are…
Veto Threats
A specific bargaining game is studied, motivated by the speech-making, billproposing, and bill-vetoing observed in legislative processes. The game has two players, a chooser and a proposer, with the preferences of the chooser not known to the proposer. The chooser starts the game by talking. Then the proposer proposes an outcome, which the chooser accepts or vetoes. Only two kinds of perfect equilibria exist. In the more interesting kind the choo…
A simple direction model of electoral competition
A simple direction model of electoral competition
Veto Threats
A specific bargaining game is studied, motivated by the speech-making, billproposing, and bill-vetoing observed in legislative processes. The game has two players, a chooser and a proposer, with the preferences of the chooser not known to the proposer. The chooser starts the game by talking. Then the proposer proposes an outcome, which the chooser accepts or vetoes. Only two kinds of perfect equilibria exist. In the more interesting kind the choo…
Low Reserve Prices in Auctions
A standard result in auction theory is that a seller’s profit-maximising reserve price is no less than his own value for the good. In practice, however, reserve prices often appear to be less than sellers’ values. This article revisits the theory of optimal reserves in the context of second-price auctions. The main result is that an optimal reserve is less than the seller’s value if the bidders are sufficiently risk averse and if their values are…
Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Auction theory (1 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Common value auction (1 works) · Competition (biology (1 works) · Competition model (1 works) · Compromise (1 works)