Rafael Repullo
Biographic Data
| ID | 5736140 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rafael Repullo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rafael |
| FAMILY NAME | Repullo |
| SIGNATURE | REPULLO R |
| AFFILIATIONS | CEMFI and CEPR |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1985 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A Model of the open Market Operations of the European Central Bank
Issued under the auspices of the Centre's research programme in Financial Economics and International Macroeconomics
Some Remarks on Leland's Model of Insider Trading
This paper shows that Leland's (1992) results on the positive effects of insider trading on investment are not robust to the introduction of noise in the insider’s information. The paper then considers two variations of his model in which the insider is risk neutral (to ensure robustness), and the investment decision is prior to the placing of the stock in the market. It is shown that if insider trading takes place in the primary market, it has n…
On the Efficiency of Equilibrium with Transaction Costs
This paper defines a concept of efficiency for economies with transactions costs, called Nash efficiency, which characterizes (in the sense of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics) equilibrium allocations in these economies. In particular, it is shown that these allocations are Nash efficient and, under certain conditions, any Nash efficient allocation may be decentralized as an equilibrium with a system of lump-sum transfers. Copyright …
Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare
Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enu…
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Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare
Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enu…
On the Efficiency of Equilibrium with Transaction Costs
This paper defines a concept of efficiency for economies with transactions costs, called Nash efficiency, which characterizes (in the sense of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics) equilibrium allocations in these economies. In particular, it is shown that these allocations are Nash efficient and, under certain conditions, any Nash efficient allocation may be decentralized as an equilibrium with a system of lump-sum transfers. Copyright …
Some Remarks on Leland's Model of Insider Trading
This paper shows that Leland's (1992) results on the positive effects of insider trading on investment are not robust to the introduction of noise in the insider’s information. The paper then considers two variations of his model in which the insider is risk neutral (to ensure robustness), and the investment decision is prior to the placing of the stock in the market. It is shown that if insider trading takes place in the primary market, it has n…
A Model of the open Market Operations of the European Central Bank
Issued under the auspices of the Centre's research programme in Financial Economics and International Macroeconomics
Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Monetary economics (2 works) · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance (1 work) · Axiom (1 work) · Axiomatic system (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Call for bids (1 work)