David Ettinger
Biographic Data
| ID | 5736709 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Ettinger |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Ettinger |
| SIGNATURE | ETTINGER D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Université Paris Dauphine; LEDa, CEREMADE, and CIRANO |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3697-4248 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids
International audience
Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms—the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)—in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the ra…
Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity-dependent price externalities affect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second…
International Relations Resources on the Web
(2000). International Relations Resources on the Web. Problems of Post-Communism: Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 59-60
Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids
International audience
International Relations Resources on the Web
(2000). International Relations Resources on the Web. Problems of Post-Communism: Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 59-60
Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity-dependent price externalities affect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second…
Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms—the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)—in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the ra…
Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids
International audience
Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Common value auction (2 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (2 works) · Auction theory (1 works) · Bidding (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Communism (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works)