Steven J Humphrey
Biographic Data
| ID | 5736938 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Steven J Humphrey |
| GIVEN NAMES | Steven J |
| FAMILY NAME | Humphrey |
| SIGNATURE | HUMPHREY S J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Osnabrück University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4024-1290 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The normative force of Savage’s axiom and the Allais paradoxes
We report the results of an experiment designed to rigorously investigate the normative force of the sure-thing principle. In a baseline treatment, we replicate our recent finding that common consequence effect violations of the axiom persist, following an opportunity to revise choices in light of a normative argument supporting it (Humphrey and Kruse in Theory and Decision 96:1–17, 2024). In a second treatment, we study the robustness of that re…
Who accepts Savage’s axiom now
We report the results of an experimental test of whether preaching the normative appeal of the sure-thing principle leads decision-makers to make choices that satisfy it. We use Allais-type decision problems to observe the incentive-compatible choices of 147 subjects, which either violate the sure-thing principle or adhere to it. Subjects are presented with normative arguments that support the counterfactual behaviour and then repeat their decisi…
Choice under Uncertainty
We review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in Ethiopia, India and Uganda. Using these data we estimate that just over 50% of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory. Our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately. Ho…
Feedback-conditional regret theory and testing regret-aversion in risky choice
Non‐transitive Choice
Recent studies have examined possible causes of the robust empirical failure of the transitivity axiom of expected utility theory by pitting regret aversion against alternative explanations such as event‐splitting effects. These tests show that cycles replicate when the latter are controlled, but are sensitive to changes in problem representation. The control for event‐splitting effects, however, does not rule out their contribution to cyclical c…
Choice under Uncertainty
We review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in Ethiopia, India and Uganda. Using these data we estimate that just over 50% of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory. Our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately. Ho…
Feedback-conditional regret theory and testing regret-aversion in risky choice
Non‐transitive Choice
Recent studies have examined possible causes of the robust empirical failure of the transitivity axiom of expected utility theory by pitting regret aversion against alternative explanations such as event‐splitting effects. These tests show that cycles replicate when the latter are controlled, but are sensitive to changes in problem representation. The control for event‐splitting effects, however, does not rule out their contribution to cyclical c…
Non‐transitive Choice
Recent studies have examined possible causes of the robust empirical failure of the transitivity axiom of expected utility theory by pitting regret aversion against alternative explanations such as event‐splitting effects. These tests show that cycles replicate when the latter are controlled, but are sensitive to changes in problem representation. The control for event‐splitting effects, however, does not rule out their contribution to cyclical c…
Feedback-conditional regret theory and testing regret-aversion in risky choice
Choice under Uncertainty
We review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in Ethiopia, India and Uganda. Using these data we estimate that just over 50% of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory. Our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately. Ho…
Who accepts Savage’s axiom now
We report the results of an experimental test of whether preaching the normative appeal of the sure-thing principle leads decision-makers to make choices that satisfy it. We use Allais-type decision problems to observe the incentive-compatible choices of 147 subjects, which either violate the sure-thing principle or adhere to it. Subjects are presented with normative arguments that support the counterfactual behaviour and then repeat their decisi…
The normative force of Savage’s axiom and the Allais paradoxes
We report the results of an experiment designed to rigorously investigate the normative force of the sure-thing principle. In a baseline treatment, we replicate our recent finding that common consequence effect violations of the axiom persist, following an opportunity to revise choices in light of a normative argument supporting it (Humphrey and Kruse in Theory and Decision 96:1–17, 2024). In a second treatment, we study the robustness of that re…
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (5 works) · Axiom (3 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Normative (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works)