Yianis Sarafidis
Biographic Data
| ID | 5737094 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yianis Sarafidis |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yianis |
| FAMILY NAME | Sarafidis |
| SIGNATURE | SARAFIDIS Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | Charles River Associates |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7398-7710 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Time inconsistency and second-order beliefs over types in extensive-form games
Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers
We consider the intertemporal price discrimination problem of a durable good monopolist facing a population of consumers who are time inconsistent. We show that price trajectories, profits and welfare are sensitive to consumers’ first- and second-order beliefs regarding their time preferences. Surprisingly, we find that sales and profits are largest when consumers are sophisticated, i.e., when consumers hold correct expectations on their own futu…
What Have you Done for me Lately? Release of Information and Strategic Manipulation of Memories
How should a rational agent (politician/employee/advertiser) release information in order to manipulate the memory imperfections of his forgetful assessor (electorate/supervisor/consumer)? This article attempts to answer this question using a memory model based on the principles of recency, similarity and repetition. I show that the problem of a rational agent who releases information to a forgetful assessor can be modelled as a standard dynamic …
What Have you Done for me Lately? Release of Information and Strategic Manipulation of Memories
How should a rational agent (politician/employee/advertiser) release information in order to manipulate the memory imperfections of his forgetful assessor (electorate/supervisor/consumer)? This article attempts to answer this question using a memory model based on the principles of recency, similarity and repetition. I show that the problem of a rational agent who releases information to a forgetful assessor can be modelled as a standard dynamic …
What Have you Done for me Lately? Release of Information and Strategic Manipulation of Memories
How should a rational agent (politician/employee/advertiser) release information in order to manipulate the memory imperfections of his forgetful assessor (electorate/supervisor/consumer)? This article attempts to answer this question using a memory model based on the principles of recency, similarity and repetition. I show that the problem of a rational agent who releases information to a forgetful assessor can be modelled as a standard dynamic …
Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers
We consider the intertemporal price discrimination problem of a durable good monopolist facing a population of consumers who are time inconsistent. We show that price trajectories, profits and welfare are sensitive to consumers’ first- and second-order beliefs regarding their time preferences. Surprisingly, we find that sales and profits are largest when consumers are sophisticated, i.e., when consumers hold correct expectations on their own futu…
Time inconsistency and second-order beliefs over types in extensive-form games
Dynamic inconsistency (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Order (exchange (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)