Anthony G Heyes
Biographic Data
| ID | 5737559 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anthony G Heyes |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anthony G |
| FAMILY NAME | Heyes |
| SIGNATURE | HEYES A G |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy
Two Proposals to Improve Price-Cap Regulation
homotheticity of preferences and for welfare or political weights. These considerations are important in reality, but either extension would require considerably more effort.
Restructuring of Ontario's electricity supply system
Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital
In a model of the lending relationship incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard, we show that increasing the liability of lenders for environmental damage done by their borrowers has a qualitatively ambiguous impact upon interest rates. This calls into question the assertion of financial community representatives that such reform will necessarily driveup interest rates and have adverse macroeconomic consequences. If it is this fear w…
Discharge Taxes When Regulatory Jurisdiction Is Incomplete
In a simple duopoly setting, the author shows that the imposition of a discharge tax that can only be enforced on one of the firms may increase industry discharges. Thus, if the regulator cannot collect such a tax universally because some firms lie outside his nominal jurisdiction or some firms are 'uninspectable' and, hence, lie outside his de facto jurisdiction, then collecting it from the subset of firms from which it can be collected will not…
Why do we price electricity the way we do? Canadian policy in the light of political‐economic theories of governmental behaviour
In the past few decades, crown electrical utilities have exhausted available economies of scale. At marginal‐cost prices, the utilities could recover costs and even a rent. Yet the available rents have not been collected through economically efficient pricing, but distributed to consumers through low prices. Who benefits from this policy? Second‐best prices are found subject to the constraint that profits are nil, and are compared to actual prici…
Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy
Why do we price electricity the way we do? Canadian policy in the light of political‐economic theories of governmental behaviour
In the past few decades, crown electrical utilities have exhausted available economies of scale. At marginal‐cost prices, the utilities could recover costs and even a rent. Yet the available rents have not been collected through economically efficient pricing, but distributed to consumers through low prices. Who benefits from this policy? Second‐best prices are found subject to the constraint that profits are nil, and are compared to actual prici…
Why do we price electricity the way we do? Canadian policy in the light of political‐economic theories of governmental behaviour
In the past few decades, crown electrical utilities have exhausted available economies of scale. At marginal‐cost prices, the utilities could recover costs and even a rent. Yet the available rents have not been collected through economically efficient pricing, but distributed to consumers through low prices. Who benefits from this policy? Second‐best prices are found subject to the constraint that profits are nil, and are compared to actual prici…
Discharge Taxes When Regulatory Jurisdiction Is Incomplete
In a simple duopoly setting, the author shows that the imposition of a discharge tax that can only be enforced on one of the firms may increase industry discharges. Thus, if the regulator cannot collect such a tax universally because some firms lie outside his nominal jurisdiction or some firms are 'uninspectable' and, hence, lie outside his de facto jurisdiction, then collecting it from the subset of firms from which it can be collected will not…
Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital
In a model of the lending relationship incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard, we show that increasing the liability of lenders for environmental damage done by their borrowers has a qualitatively ambiguous impact upon interest rates. This calls into question the assertion of financial community representatives that such reform will necessarily driveup interest rates and have adverse macroeconomic consequences. If it is this fear w…
Restructuring of Ontario's electricity supply system
Two Proposals to Improve Price-Cap Regulation
homotheticity of preferences and for welfare or political weights. These considerations are important in reality, but either extension would require considerably more effort.
Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy
Economics (5 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Market economy (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 works) · Adverse selection (1 works)