JOHAN STENNEK
Biographic Data
| ID | 5737728 |
|---|---|
| NAME | JOHAN STENNEK |
| GIVEN NAMES | JOHAN |
| FAMILY NAME | STENNEK |
| SIGNATURE | STENNEK J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Center for Economic and Policy Research |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 1 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Industry Concentration and Welfare
There is diverging empirical evidence on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers: consumer prices (and thus presumably competitors' profits) often rise while competitors' share prices fall. Our model of endogenous mergers provides a possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that anti‐competitive mergers may reduce competitors' share prices, if the merger announcement informs the market that the competitors lost a race to buy the target. A…
The Political Economy of Antitrust
This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic iss…
The Political Economy of Antitrust, Volume 282 (Contributions to Economic Analysis) (Contributions to Economic Analysis)
No prominent works on this page.
The Political Economy of Antitrust
This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic iss…
The Political Economy of Antitrust, Volume 282 (Contributions to Economic Analysis) (Contributions to Economic Analysis)
Industry Concentration and Welfare
There is diverging empirical evidence on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers: consumer prices (and thus presumably competitors' profits) often rise while competitors' share prices fall. Our model of endogenous mergers provides a possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that anti‐competitive mergers may reduce competitors' share prices, if the merger announcement informs the market that the competitors lost a race to buy the target. A…
Economics (2 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (2 works) · Antitrust law (1 work) · Antitrustwetgeving (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Competitor analysis (1 work) · Concurrentiebeleid (1 work) · Consolidation and merger of corporations (1 work) · Consumer welfare (1 work) · Context (archaeology) (1 work)