Arturo Antón
Biographic Data
| ID | 5738525 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Arturo Antón |
| GIVEN NAMES | Arturo |
| FAMILY NAME | Antón |
| SIGNATURE | ANTON A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9584-5203 |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 1 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 1 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A Two‐sided Matching Model of Monitored Finance
We analyse an incentive contracting model of partnership formation between heterogeneous investors and entrepreneurs. Partnerships are subject to double‐sided moral hazard problems in entrepreneurial action and monitoring by investors. Greater monitoring ability implies stronger incentives to monitor. On the other hand, low‐collateral borrowers have lower inside equity participation. Hence the incentive problem is best mitigated by assigning low‐…
No prominent works on this page.
A Two‐sided Matching Model of Monitored Finance
We analyse an incentive contracting model of partnership formation between heterogeneous investors and entrepreneurs. Partnerships are subject to double‐sided moral hazard problems in entrepreneurial action and monitoring by investors. Greater monitoring ability implies stronger incentives to monitor. On the other hand, low‐collateral borrowers have lower inside equity participation. Hence the incentive problem is best mitigated by assigning low‐…
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 work) · Collateral (1 work) · Collateralized debt obligation (1 work) · Corporate Finance and Governance (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Equity (law) (1 work) · Finance (1 work) · Finance (1 work) · General partnership (1 work) · Incentive (1 work)