Kaniṣka Dam
Biographic Data
| ID | 5738526 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kaniṣka Dam |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kaniṣka |
| FAMILY NAME | Dam |
| SIGNATURE | DAM K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas and El Colegio de México |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7418-623X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market
A Two‐sided Matching Model of Monitored Finance
We analyse an incentive contracting model of partnership formation between heterogeneous investors and entrepreneurs. Partnerships are subject to double‐sided moral hazard problems in entrepreneurial action and monitoring by investors. Greater monitoring ability implies stronger incentives to monitor. On the other hand, low‐collateral borrowers have lower inside equity participation. Hence the incentive problem is best mitigated by assigning low‐…
Incentives and Income Distribution in Tenancy Relationships
I analyze a problem of partnership formation between heterogeneous principals and agents, where each partnership is subject to a moral-hazard problem. In a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy, wealthier agents work in more productive lands following a positively assortative matching pattern, since higher wealth has greater marginal effect in high-productivity lands. Consequently, the matches that consist of less wealthy agents are not able to im…
No prominent works on this page.
Incentives and Income Distribution in Tenancy Relationships
I analyze a problem of partnership formation between heterogeneous principals and agents, where each partnership is subject to a moral-hazard problem. In a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy, wealthier agents work in more productive lands following a positively assortative matching pattern, since higher wealth has greater marginal effect in high-productivity lands. Consequently, the matches that consist of less wealthy agents are not able to im…
Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market
A Two‐sided Matching Model of Monitored Finance
We analyse an incentive contracting model of partnership formation between heterogeneous investors and entrepreneurs. Partnerships are subject to double‐sided moral hazard problems in entrepreneurial action and monitoring by investors. Greater monitoring ability implies stronger incentives to monitor. On the other hand, low‐collateral borrowers have lower inside equity participation. Hence the incentive problem is best mitigated by assigning low‐…
Economics (3 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 work) · Collateral (1 work) · Collateralized debt obligation (1 work) · Compensation (psychology (1 work)