MANIPUSHPAK MITRA
Biographic Data
| ID | 5738932 |
|---|---|
| NAME | MANIPUSHPAK MITRA |
| GIVEN NAMES | MANIPUSHPAK |
| FAMILY NAME | MITRA |
| SIGNATURE | MITRA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indian Statistical Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2081-6173 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
Social Aggregations and Distributional Ethics
This book analyzes the following four distinct, although not dissimilar, areas of social choice theory and welfare economics: nonstrategic choice, Harsanyi's aggregation theorems, distributional ethics and strategic choice. While for aggregation of individual ranking of social states, whether the persons behave strategically or non-strategically, the decision making takes place under complete certainty; in the Harsanyi framework uncertainty has a…
Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
Equilibrium Coexistence of Public and Private Firms and the Plausibility of Price Competition
We consider a differentiated product duopoly where a regulated firm competes with a private firm. The instrument of regulation is the level of privatization. First, the regulator determines the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Thereafter, both firms endogenously choose the mode of competition (thatis, whether to compete in price or quantity). Finally, the two firms compete in the market. Under a very general demand specification…
On the probability ratio index as a measure of electoral competition
This paper deals with the fundamental issue of quantifying the degree of competitiveness underlying an election in a society. That is, given the vote shares of competing political parties in the election one needs to arrive at a representative metric of electoral competition. The vote share of a party represents its influence on the outcome of the election. A summary measure of differences of such influences across parties, aggregated in an unamb…
Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Rankings in the Presence of Welfare Concerns
We revisit the comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in a symmetric differentiated oligopoly where each firm maximizes a weighted average of its own profit and welfare. Under very general specifications, Bertrand competition yields higher prices and profits, and lower quantities, consumer surplus, and welfare than Cournot when the weight on profit is lower than a threshold value. The threshold weight on profit (welfare) can be arbit…
Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value
Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility
A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both firms use the same essential input. The regulator's objectives are (i) to ensure financing of the essential input and (ii) to generate competition in the downstream market. The regulatory mechanism grants non‐discriminatory access of the essential facility to the entrant provided it pays a two‐par…
Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility
A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both firms use the same essential input. The regulator's objectives are (i) to ensure financing of the essential input and (ii) to generate competition in the downstream market. The regulatory mechanism grants non‐discriminatory access of the essential facility to the entrant provided it pays a two‐par…
On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value
Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Rankings in the Presence of Welfare Concerns
We revisit the comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in a symmetric differentiated oligopoly where each firm maximizes a weighted average of its own profit and welfare. Under very general specifications, Bertrand competition yields higher prices and profits, and lower quantities, consumer surplus, and welfare than Cournot when the weight on profit is lower than a threshold value. The threshold weight on profit (welfare) can be arbit…
Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
Equilibrium Coexistence of Public and Private Firms and the Plausibility of Price Competition
We consider a differentiated product duopoly where a regulated firm competes with a private firm. The instrument of regulation is the level of privatization. First, the regulator determines the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Thereafter, both firms endogenously choose the mode of competition (thatis, whether to compete in price or quantity). Finally, the two firms compete in the market. Under a very general demand specification…
On the probability ratio index as a measure of electoral competition
This paper deals with the fundamental issue of quantifying the degree of competitiveness underlying an election in a society. That is, given the vote shares of competing political parties in the election one needs to arrive at a representative metric of electoral competition. The vote share of a party represents its influence on the outcome of the election. A summary measure of differences of such influences across parties, aggregated in an unamb…
Social Aggregations and Distributional Ethics
This book analyzes the following four distinct, although not dissimilar, areas of social choice theory and welfare economics: nonstrategic choice, Harsanyi's aggregation theorems, distributional ethics and strategic choice. While for aggregation of individual ranking of social states, whether the persons behave strategically or non-strategically, the decision making takes place under complete certainty; in the Harsanyi framework uncertainty has a…
Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
Economics (7 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Statistics (4 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Welfare (3 works)