Rafael Eldor
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739282 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rafael Eldor |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rafael |
| FAMILY NAME | Eldor |
| SIGNATURE | ELDOR R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Reichman University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Firm's Output under Uncertainty and Asymmetric Taxation
We consider competitive firms operating under price uncertainty when taxation is asymmetric (i.e. profits are taxed at a higher rate than losses are compensated). In the absence of risk sharing tools, the larger ‘gap’ in taxation may either lower or increase the firm's optimal output, depending on whether the relative measure of risk aversion is less than or larger than 1. In the presence of risk sharing markets optimal output does not depend on …
On the Risk-Adjusted Effective Protection Rate
Using the assumptions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model this paper presents a measure of the effective protection rate which adjusts for the industry's risk. It is shown that if the tariff on the final good is greater (smaller) than the weighted average tariff on the traded inputs, then the effective protection increases (decreases) as one moves from an industry with low risk (low beta) to an industry with high risk (high beta), holding other th…
No prominent works on this page.
On the Risk-Adjusted Effective Protection Rate
Using the assumptions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model this paper presents a measure of the effective protection rate which adjusts for the industry's risk. It is shown that if the tariff on the final good is greater (smaller) than the weighted average tariff on the traded inputs, then the effective protection increases (decreases) as one moves from an industry with low risk (low beta) to an industry with high risk (high beta), holding other th…
Firm's Output under Uncertainty and Asymmetric Taxation
We consider competitive firms operating under price uncertainty when taxation is asymmetric (i.e. profits are taxed at a higher rate than losses are compensated). In the absence of risk sharing tools, the larger ‘gap’ in taxation may either lower or increase the firm's optimal output, depending on whether the relative measure of risk aversion is less than or larger than 1. In the presence of risk sharing markets optimal output does not depend on …
Economics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Asset (computer security) (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Capital (architecture) (1 work) · Capital asset pricing model (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Computer security (1 work) · Corporate Finance and Governance (1 work) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (1 work)