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Enrica Detragiache

Biographic Data

ID5739312
NAMEEnrica Detragiache
GIVEN NAMESEnrica
FAMILY NAMEDetragiache
SIGNATUREDETRAGIACHE E
AFFILIATIONSJohns Hopkins University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS5
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1994
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1999
H-INDEX1
  • Liberalizing Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues: Aspects analytiques

    Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Enrica Detragiache et al.•BOOK•Liberalizing Capital Movements•1999

  • Technology diffusion and international income convergence

    Open Access•Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1998•References: 7

  • Fiscal Adjustment and Official Reserves in Sovereign Debt Negotiations

    Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Economica•1996•Cited by: 1

    Empirical studies indicate that official reserves increase the creditworthiness of highly indebted countries. This evidence cannot be explained by existing bargaining models of sovereign debt because sovereign immunity shelters official reserves from creditors' seizure. In the model proposed here, to service foreign debt the government must raise revenue through distortionary taxation. Large reserves reduce the fiscal burden of debt service, weak…

  • Sensible buybacks of sovereign debt

    Open Access•Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • Interest rates, official lending, and the debt crisis: A reassessment

    Open Access•Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli Demirgüç‐Kunt et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1994•Cited by: 3

  • Interest rates, official lending, and the debt crisis: A reassessment

    Open Access•Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli Demirgüç‐Kunt et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1994•Cited by: 3

  • Fiscal Adjustment and Official Reserves in Sovereign Debt Negotiations

    Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Economica•1996•Cited by: 1

    Empirical studies indicate that official reserves increase the creditworthiness of highly indebted countries. This evidence cannot be explained by existing bargaining models of sovereign debt because sovereign immunity shelters official reserves from creditors' seizure. In the model proposed here, to service foreign debt the government must raise revenue through distortionary taxation. Large reserves reduce the fiscal burden of debt service, weak…

  • Sensible buybacks of sovereign debt

    Open Access•Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • Sensible buybacks of sovereign debt

    Open Access•Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • Interest rates, official lending, and the debt crisis: A reassessment

    Open Access•Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli Demirgüç‐Kunt et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1994•Cited by: 3

  • Fiscal Adjustment and Official Reserves in Sovereign Debt Negotiations

    Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Economica•1996•Cited by: 1

    Empirical studies indicate that official reserves increase the creditworthiness of highly indebted countries. This evidence cannot be explained by existing bargaining models of sovereign debt because sovereign immunity shelters official reserves from creditors' seizure. In the model proposed here, to service foreign debt the government must raise revenue through distortionary taxation. Large reserves reduce the fiscal burden of debt service, weak…

  • Technology diffusion and international income convergence

    Open Access•Enrica Detragiache•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1998•References: 7

  • Liberalizing Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues: Aspects analytiques

    Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Enrica Detragiache et al.•BOOK•Liberalizing Capital Movements•1999

Economics (4 works) · Debt (3 works) · Financial system (3 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (3 works) · Monetary economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · External debt (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · International economics (2 works)

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