Richard Cantor
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739569 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard Cantor |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard |
| FAMILY NAME | Cantor |
| SIGNATURE | CANTOR R |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Firm-Specific Training and Contract Length
Wages subject to continuous renegotiations provide inefficient incentives for the creation of firm-specific human capital if training requires both firm investment and worker effort. Noncontingent career-long, fixed-wage contracts do not induce efficient levels of training because they award all the quasi-rents from training to the firm, leaving no incentive for trainee effort. Intermediate-length, fixed-wage contracts with known expiration dates…
Work Effort and Contract Length
Contracts of deterministic duration are derived as solutions to a moral hazard problem in a framework that extends E. Fama's (1980) single-period labor contracts model by introducing recontracting costs and long-term contracts. A worker can be induced to put forth unobservable effort if he knows that his wages in future contracts will be related to his past overall productivity. As contract length is increased, the worker is more likely to shirk …
No prominent works on this page.
Work Effort and Contract Length
Contracts of deterministic duration are derived as solutions to a moral hazard problem in a framework that extends E. Fama's (1980) single-period labor contracts model by introducing recontracting costs and long-term contracts. A worker can be induced to put forth unobservable effort if he knows that his wages in future contracts will be related to his past overall productivity. As contract length is increased, the worker is more likely to shirk …
Firm-Specific Training and Contract Length
Wages subject to continuous renegotiations provide inefficient incentives for the creation of firm-specific human capital if training requires both firm investment and worker effort. Noncontingent career-long, fixed-wage contracts do not induce efficient levels of training because they award all the quasi-rents from training to the firm, leaving no incentive for trainee effort. Intermediate-length, fixed-wage contracts with known expiration dates…
Economics (2 works) · Efficiency wage (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Labour economics (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Wage (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Business (1 work)