K L Glen Ueng
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739601 |
|---|---|
| NAME | K L Glen Ueng |
| GIVEN NAMES | K L Glen |
| FAMILY NAME | Ueng |
| SIGNATURE | UENG K L G |
| AFFILIATIONS | National Chengchi University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5688-6782 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 1 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 1 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Constrained Efficient Fine‐cum‐Tax Rate Structures: The Case of Constant Relative Risk Aversion
This paper explores the possibility that fines and tax rates impose different welfare costs on different types of taxpayer, so that the government may want to apply different fine/tax rate treatments to different types of taxpayer. Under the assumption that taxpayers exhibit constant relative risk aversion, we characterize the constrained Pareto‐efficient fine/tax rate structure, showing that: (i) the co‐existence of compliers (the above‐ground e…
Constrained Efficient Fine‐cum‐Tax Rate Structures: The Case of Constant Relative Risk Aversion
This paper explores the possibility that fines and tax rates impose different welfare costs on different types of taxpayer, so that the government may want to apply different fine/tax rate treatments to different types of taxpayer. Under the assumption that taxpayers exhibit constant relative risk aversion, we characterize the constrained Pareto‐efficient fine/tax rate structure, showing that: (i) the co‐existence of compliers (the above‐ground e…
Constrained Efficient Fine‐cum‐Tax Rate Structures: The Case of Constant Relative Risk Aversion
This paper explores the possibility that fines and tax rates impose different welfare costs on different types of taxpayer, so that the government may want to apply different fine/tax rate treatments to different types of taxpayer. Under the assumption that taxpayers exhibit constant relative risk aversion, we characterize the constrained Pareto‐efficient fine/tax rate structure, showing that: (i) the co‐existence of compliers (the above‐ground e…
Computer Science (1 works) · Constant (computer programming) (1 works) · Econometrics (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Expected utility hypothesis (1 works) · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis (1 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (1 works) · Government (linguistics) (1 works) · Macroeconomics (1 works) · Market economy (1 works)