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Paul Pfleiderer

Biographic Data

ID5739722
NAMEPaul Pfleiderer
GIVEN NAMESPaul
FAMILY NAMEPfleiderer
SIGNATUREPFLEIDERER P
AFFILIATIONSStanford University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS23
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1983
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
H-INDEX3
  • Chameleons: The Misuse of Theoretical Models in Finance and Economics

    Open Access•Paul Pfleiderer•ARTICLE•Economica•2020•References: 17

    In this paper I discuss how theoretical models in finance and economics are used in ways that make them ‘chameleons’, and how chameleons devalue the intellectual currency and muddy policy debates. A model becomes a chameleon when it is built on assumptions with dubious connections to the real world but nevertheless has conclusions that are uncritically (or not critically enough) applied to understanding our economy. I discuss how chameleons are c…

  • Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is not Expensive

    Open Access•Anat R Admati, Peter M Demarzo et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    We examine the pervasive view that "equity is expensive," which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely.We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak.For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity.It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capi…

  • Noisytalk.com: Broadcasting Opinions in a Noisy Environment

    Open Access•Anat R Admati, Paul Pfleiderer et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2001

  • Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium

    Anat R Admati, Paul Pfleiderer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Cited by: 6

    The authors develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Allocations of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, risk-sharing considerations lead to equilibria in which monitoring takes place. Under certain conditions, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient and all agents ho…

  • A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983•Cited by: 14

  • A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983•Cited by: 14

  • Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium

    Anat R Admati, Paul Pfleiderer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Cited by: 6

    The authors develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Allocations of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, risk-sharing considerations lead to equilibria in which monitoring takes place. Under certain conditions, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient and all agents ho…

  • Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is not Expensive

    Open Access•Anat R Admati, Peter M Demarzo et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    We examine the pervasive view that "equity is expensive," which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely.We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak.For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity.It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capi…

  • A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983•Cited by: 14

  • Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium

    Anat R Admati, Paul Pfleiderer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Cited by: 6

    The authors develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Allocations of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, risk-sharing considerations lead to equilibria in which monitoring takes place. Under certain conditions, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient and all agents ho…

  • Noisytalk.com: Broadcasting Opinions in a Noisy Environment

    Open Access•Anat R Admati, Paul Pfleiderer et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2001

  • Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is not Expensive

    Open Access•Anat R Admati, Peter M Demarzo et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    We examine the pervasive view that "equity is expensive," which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely.We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak.For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity.It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capi…

  • Chameleons: The Misuse of Theoretical Models in Finance and Economics

    Open Access•Paul Pfleiderer•ARTICLE•Economica•2020•References: 17

    In this paper I discuss how theoretical models in finance and economics are used in ways that make them ‘chameleons’, and how chameleons devalue the intellectual currency and muddy policy debates. A model becomes a chameleon when it is built on assumptions with dubious connections to the real world but nevertheless has conclusions that are uncritically (or not critically enough) applied to understanding our economy. I discuss how chameleons are c…

Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Monetary economics (2 works) · Advertising (1 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Complex Network Analysis Techniques (1 works) · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Computer security (1 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae