Paolo G Garella
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739737 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Paolo G Garella |
| GIVEN NAMES | Paolo G |
| FAMILY NAME | Garella |
| SIGNATURE | GARELLA P G |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6830-4786 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Behavior based price personalization under vertical product differentiation
Imperfect Information and Employment Variability
This paper studies the effects of uncertainty about the workers' skills or productivity on the hiring decisions of a monopolistic firm. When productivity is not observable, and cannot be conditioned upon, less-than-full information is shown to impart a downward bias to hirings across all states of nature. The reason is that the firm, by keeping employment lower than under full information, exploits its hiring decisions in order is shape the proba…
Adverse Selection and the Middleman
The question analyzed in this paper is whether a market that otherwise experiences an Akerlofian "lemons impasse" can function if a middleman organizes trade. It is found that the middleman's intervention can prove successful even if neither signals nor quality screening methods exist that could help him to assess the good's qualities. The result is obtained under the hypothesis that the middleman randomizes his price offers to the sellers of the…
Adverse Selection and the Middleman
The question analyzed in this paper is whether a market that otherwise experiences an Akerlofian "lemons impasse" can function if a middleman organizes trade. It is found that the middleman's intervention can prove successful even if neither signals nor quality screening methods exist that could help him to assess the good's qualities. The result is obtained under the hypothesis that the middleman randomizes his price offers to the sellers of the…
Adverse Selection and the Middleman
The question analyzed in this paper is whether a market that otherwise experiences an Akerlofian "lemons impasse" can function if a middleman organizes trade. It is found that the middleman's intervention can prove successful even if neither signals nor quality screening methods exist that could help him to assess the good's qualities. The result is obtained under the hypothesis that the middleman randomizes his price offers to the sellers of the…
Imperfect Information and Employment Variability
This paper studies the effects of uncertainty about the workers' skills or productivity on the hiring decisions of a monopolistic firm. When productivity is not observable, and cannot be conditioned upon, less-than-full information is shown to impart a downward bias to hirings across all states of nature. The reason is that the firm, by keeping employment lower than under full information, exploits its hiring decisions in order is shape the proba…
Behavior based price personalization under vertical product differentiation
Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Adverse selection (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (1 work) · Cournot competition (1 work)