Emmanuel Dechenaux
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739823 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Emmanuel Dechenaux |
| GIVEN NAMES | Emmanuel |
| FAMILY NAME | Dechenaux |
| SIGNATURE | DECHENAUX E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kent State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4734-0793 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of cont…
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
This paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance. The firm may offer a bribe to pre‐empt the inspection. Corruption is unfeasible in the one‐shot game because of inspector hold‐up. In an infinitely repeated game, we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy. In this model, the most likely bribe‐givers are not the firms that benef…
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
This paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance. The firm may offer a bribe to pre‐empt the inspection. Corruption is unfeasible in the one‐shot game because of inspector hold‐up. In an infinitely repeated game, we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy. In this model, the most likely bribe‐givers are not the firms that benef…
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
This paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance. The firm may offer a bribe to pre‐empt the inspection. Corruption is unfeasible in the one‐shot game because of inspector hold‐up. In an infinitely repeated game, we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy. In this model, the most likely bribe‐givers are not the firms that benef…
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of cont…
Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Collusion (1 works) · Common value auction (1 works) · Competition (biology) (1 works) · Compliance (psychology) (1 works)