Mattias Ganslandt
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739920 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mattias Ganslandt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mattias |
| FAMILY NAME | Ganslandt |
| SIGNATURE | GANSLANDT M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Center for European Law and Economics (CELEC) |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 1 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 1 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures
Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization, we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they balance the small firms' incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders' indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger mode…
Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures
Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization, we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they balance the small firms' incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders' indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger mode…
Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures
Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization, we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they balance the small firms' incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders' indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger mode…
Antisymmetry (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Cartel (1 work) · Collusion (1 work) · Corporate Finance and Governance (1 work) · Digital Platforms and Economics (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Empirical evidence (1 work) · Finance (1 work) · Finance (1 work)