Steve Fetter
Biographic Data
| ID | 5771062 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Steve Fetter |
| GIVEN NAMES | Steve |
| FAMILY NAME | Fetter |
| SIGNATURE | FETTER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, College Park |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6589-2586 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 74 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Distinction Without a Difference: The UK Shift from Population to Leadership Nuclear Targeting
This article examines the legal implications of the United Kingdom's shift in nuclear deterrent strategy in the early 1980s from population to leadership targeting. Drawing on the 1978 Duff-Mason report, a government study evaluating options for deterring the Soviet Union, as well as other archival sources and open-source data, we construct representative population and leadership target sets and estimate the resulting civilian fatalities using n…
Can the Iron Dome Be Transmuted into a Golden Dome
Emerging technologies and challenges to nuclear stability
Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy
Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea
North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear co…
Reexamining Homeland Missile Defense against North Korea
In 2016 and 2017, North Korea demonstrated a range of technologies that brought it much closer to deploying an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). After the November 2017 test of the Hwasong
The Limits of Damage Limitation
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few benefits while incurring serious costs.1 In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damage-limitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage …
Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China
As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the So…
Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions
Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce-w…
Limited National and Allied Missile Defense
International Security - Volume 26, Number 4, Spring 2002
National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states, then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a “normal” national security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility: Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern the risks to the United States of being vulnerab…
Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis
July 01 1996 Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis Steve Fetter, Steve Fetter Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park. He thanks Nancy Gallagher for her helpful comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Devin T. Hagerty Devin T. Hagerty Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Marylan…
Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis
July 01 1996 Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis Steve Fetter, Steve Fetter Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park. He thanks Nancy Gallagher for her helpful comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Devin T. Hagerty Devin T. Hagerty Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Marylan…
Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done
Source code and data files used to produce these results are provided here in ZIP format. They include both executable and FORTRAN source code, as well as all supporting data files and example input files
An Exchange on Stockpile Confidence
We have read with great interest article by Steve Fetter recently published in Internationzal Security.1 We are concerned with fundamental thesis of Fetter and others who believe that technical and political confidence in reliability of U.S. weapons can be high during a comprehensive test ban (CTB). We believe that nuclear weapons are very much like other types of high-technology military equipmenttanks, rockets, airplanes, radar systems, etc. Ho…
Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban
Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban
Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done
Source code and data files used to produce these results are provided here in ZIP format. They include both executable and FORTRAN source code, as well as all supporting data files and example input files
Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China
As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the So…
National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states, then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a “normal” national security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility: Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern the risks to the United States of being vulnerab…
Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions
Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce-w…
Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea
North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear co…
Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban
Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban
Emerging technologies and challenges to nuclear stability
Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy
The Limits of Damage Limitation
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few benefits while incurring serious costs.1 In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damage-limitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage …
An Exchange on Stockpile Confidence
We have read with great interest article by Steve Fetter recently published in Internationzal Security.1 We are concerned with fundamental thesis of Fetter and others who believe that technical and political confidence in reliability of U.S. weapons can be high during a comprehensive test ban (CTB). We believe that nuclear weapons are very much like other types of high-technology military equipmenttanks, rockets, airplanes, radar systems, etc. Ho…
Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban
An Exchange on Stockpile Confidence
We have read with great interest article by Steve Fetter recently published in Internationzal Security.1 We are concerned with fundamental thesis of Fetter and others who believe that technical and political confidence in reliability of U.S. weapons can be high during a comprehensive test ban (CTB). We believe that nuclear weapons are very much like other types of high-technology military equipmenttanks, rockets, airplanes, radar systems, etc. Ho…
Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban
Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done
Source code and data files used to produce these results are provided here in ZIP format. They include both executable and FORTRAN source code, as well as all supporting data files and example input files
Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis
July 01 1996 Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis Steve Fetter, Steve Fetter Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park. He thanks Nancy Gallagher for her helpful comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Devin T. Hagerty Devin T. Hagerty Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Marylan…
Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis
July 01 1996 Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis Steve Fetter, Steve Fetter Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park. He thanks Nancy Gallagher for her helpful comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Devin T. Hagerty Devin T. Hagerty Steve Fetter is an associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, University of Marylan…
National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states, then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a “normal” national security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility: Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern the risks to the United States of being vulnerab…
Limited National and Allied Missile Defense
International Security - Volume 26, Number 4, Spring 2002
Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions
Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce-w…
Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China
As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the So…
The Limits of Damage Limitation
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few benefits while incurring serious costs.1 In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damage-limitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage …
Reexamining Homeland Missile Defense against North Korea
In 2016 and 2017, North Korea demonstrated a range of technologies that brought it much closer to deploying an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). After the November 2017 test of the Hwasong
Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy
Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea
North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear co…
Distinction Without a Difference: The UK Shift from Population to Leadership Nuclear Targeting
This article examines the legal implications of the United Kingdom's shift in nuclear deterrent strategy in the early 1980s from population to leadership targeting. Drawing on the 1978 Duff-Mason report, a government study evaluating options for deterring the Soviet Union, as well as other archival sources and open-source data, we construct representative population and leadership target sets and estimate the resulting civilian fatalities using n…
Can the Iron Dome Be Transmuted into a Golden Dome
Emerging technologies and challenges to nuclear stability
Political science (15 works) · Law (12 works) · Law (12 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (12 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (8 works) · Engineering (6 works) · Nuclear weapon (6 works) · Computer security (5 works) · Missile (5 works)