Till Proeger
Biographic Data
| ID | 5773433 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Till Proeger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Till |
| FAMILY NAME | Proeger |
| SIGNATURE | PROEGER T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Göttingen |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9446-6829 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Institutional rules for the up-take of regulatory experiments
Experiments are an important governance instrument for fostering learning between actors, improving governance, and managing transition pathways for sustainable development. However, determinants of the up-take of the result of experiments are underexplored in the transition experimentation literature. Consequently, we explore the role of experimental design and institutions in this up-take. This paper examines the following research question: Ho…
The role of communication on an experimental market for tradable development rights
Experimental evidence on the resilience of a cap & trade system for land consumption in Germany
Experimental evidence on the resilience of a cap & trade system for land consumption in Germany
The role of communication on an experimental market for tradable development rights
Institutional rules for the up-take of regulatory experiments
Experiments are an important governance instrument for fostering learning between actors, improving governance, and managing transition pathways for sustainable development. However, determinants of the up-take of the result of experiments are underexplored in the transition experimentation literature. Consequently, we explore the role of experimental design and institutions in this up-take. This paper examines the following research question: Ho…
Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Housing Market and Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Urban Planning and Valuation (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Collusion (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)