Frank W Heinemann

Biographic Data

ID5805035
NAMEFrank W Heinemann
GIVEN NAMESFrank W
FAMILY NAMEHeinemann
SIGNATUREHEINEMANN F W
AFFILIATIONSTechnische Universität Berlin
ORCID0000-0002-9007-8404
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS2
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2004
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2008
H-INDEX1

  • Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

    Open AccessCamille Cornand, Frank Heinemann et al.ARTICLEThe Economic Journal2008Cited by: 2References: 25

    Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare: public announcements serve as focal points for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that reducing public signals' precision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare. This article sh…

  • Wage Indexation and Monetary Policy

    Frank Heinemann, Frank W HeinemannARTICLEJournal of Institutional and…2006

    This paper analyzes the effect of indexed wage contracts on inflation and social welfare in a Barro-Gordon model with state-contingent monetary policy. Wage indexation reduces the inflation bias but may raise the variance of inflation rates. In social optimum, wages are fully indexed to the price level, but this requires optimal wage adjustments to productivity shocks. If wage adjustments to productivity are suboptimal, the second-best solution c…

  • Publicité limitée de l'information et sur-réaction aux annonces lors des épisodes spéculatifs

    Camille Cornand, Frank Heinemann et al.ARTICLERevue économique2006

    National audience

  • Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises

    Christina E Bannier, Frank Heinemann et al.ARTICLEJournal of Institutional and…2005

    This paper reconsiders a central bank's problem of determining rules for information dissemination and risk-taking behavior that minimize the probability of currency crises. In a global-games approach, we find that optimal transparency is adversely related to prior market beliefs. In countries with pessimistic prior beliefs about economic performance, the central bank should commit to disclosing information with maximal precision. In addition, it…

  • Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

    Open AccessFrank Heinemann, Frank W Heinemann et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2004