Pascalis Raimondos
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5805262 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Pascalis Raimondos |
| PRENOMES | Pascalis |
| SOBRENOME | Raimondos |
| ASSINATURA | RAIMONDOS P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Copenhagen Business School |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8580-3595 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1997 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Competing for a Profit‐Shifting Firm
We investigate tax competition between two asymmetric countries bidding for an MNE subsidiary. Departing from standard zero‐sum models of profit reallocation between hosts, we introduce an “inward shifting” mechanism where profits flow from a high‐tax headquarters country to the host. This expands the host's tax base, strategically incentivizing the small country to adopt lax transfer pricing regulations. In equilibrium, the small country leverag…
Foreign influence, control, and indirect ownership
Tariff–tax reforms and market access
Optimal foreign aid and tariffs
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government for allocating more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the e®ects of changes in the degree o…
Foreign Aid, Domestic Investment and Welfare
This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two‐period, two‐country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer‐induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, s…
On the tying of aid to tariff reform
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government for allocating more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the e®ects of changes in the degree o…
On the tying of aid to tariff reform
Tariff–tax reforms and market access
Optimal foreign aid and tariffs
Foreign Aid, Domestic Investment and Welfare
This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two‐period, two‐country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer‐induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, s…
On the tying of aid to tariff reform
Foreign Aid, Domestic Investment and Welfare
This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two‐period, two‐country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer‐induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, s…
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government for allocating more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the e®ects of changes in the degree o…
Optimal foreign aid and tariffs
Tariff–tax reforms and market access
Foreign influence, control, and indirect ownership
Competing for a Profit‐Shifting Firm
We investigate tax competition between two asymmetric countries bidding for an MNE subsidiary. Departing from standard zero‐sum models of profit reallocation between hosts, we introduce an “inward shifting” mechanism where profits flow from a high‐tax headquarters country to the host. This expands the host's tax base, strategically incentivizing the small country to adopt lax transfer pricing regulations. In equilibrium, the small country leverag…
Economics (6 obras) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (4 obras) · International Development and Aid (4 obras) · International economics (4 obras) · Government (linguistics (3 obras) · Market economy (3 obras) · Microeconomics (3 obras) · Pareto principle (3 obras) · Politics (3 obras) · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare (3 obras)