Federico Echenique
Biographic Data
| ID | 5805590 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Federico Echenique |
| GIVEN NAMES | Federico |
| FAMILY NAME | Echenique |
| SIGNATURE | ECHENIQUE F |
| AFFILIATIONS | California Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1567-6770 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A Characterisation of ‘Phelpsian’ Statistical Discrimination
We establish that a type of statistical discrimination—that based on informativeness of signals about workers’ skills and the ability appropriately to match workers to tasks—is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependen…
The perception-adjusted Luce model
The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations
We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the …
A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions
We develop an index of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. We present an index that satisfies (1) and (2) and that is based on agents' social interactions: the extent to which blacks interact with blacks, whites with whites, etc. We use the index to measure school and res…
Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution
Governments use redistributive policies to favor relatively unproductive economic sectors. Traditional economic wisdom teaches that the government should instead buy out the agents in these sectors, and let them relocate to more productive sectors. We show that redistribution to a sector whose agents have highly correlated incomes generates an insurance value. Taking this insurance value into account, a buy-out is not sufficient to compensate the…
Information is not about measurability
The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations
We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the …
A Characterisation of ‘Phelpsian’ Statistical Discrimination
We establish that a type of statistical discrimination—that based on informativeness of signals about workers’ skills and the ability appropriately to match workers to tasks—is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependen…
Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution
Governments use redistributive policies to favor relatively unproductive economic sectors. Traditional economic wisdom teaches that the government should instead buy out the agents in these sectors, and let them relocate to more productive sectors. We show that redistribution to a sector whose agents have highly correlated incomes generates an insurance value. Taking this insurance value into account, a buy-out is not sufficient to compensate the…
Information is not about measurability
A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions
We develop an index of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. We present an index that satisfies (1) and (2) and that is based on agents' social interactions: the extent to which blacks interact with blacks, whites with whites, etc. We use the index to measure school and res…
Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution
Governments use redistributive policies to favor relatively unproductive economic sectors. Traditional economic wisdom teaches that the government should instead buy out the agents in these sectors, and let them relocate to more productive sectors. We show that redistribution to a sector whose agents have highly correlated incomes generates an insurance value. Taking this insurance value into account, a buy-out is not sufficient to compensate the…
The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations
We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the …
The perception-adjusted Luce model
A Characterisation of ‘Phelpsian’ Statistical Discrimination
We establish that a type of statistical discrimination—that based on informativeness of signals about workers’ skills and the ability appropriately to match workers to tasks—is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependen…
Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Axiom (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (2 works)