Jeanine Miklós‐Thal
Biographic Data
| ID | 5805627 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeanine Miklós‐Thal |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeanine |
| FAMILY NAME | Miklós‐Thal |
| SIGNATURE | THAL J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Rochester |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4014-8259 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The ethics of online steering
Pass-Through as an Economic Tool
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) analyze the social incidence of competition and the output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by considering the hypothetical entrance of exogenous quantity into a market. The formulas they use for this purpose, however, are correct only for marginal changes in exogenous quantity starting at zero or if demand functions are linear. We show how using the correct formulas changes Weyl and Fabinger's ana…
Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests
The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmstrom, 1982/1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing…
Pass-Through as an Economic Tool
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) analyze the social incidence of competition and the output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by considering the hypothetical entrance of exogenous quantity into a market. The formulas they use for this purpose, however, are correct only for marginal changes in exogenous quantity starting at zero or if demand functions are linear. We show how using the correct formulas changes Weyl and Fabinger's ana…
Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests
The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmstrom, 1982/1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing…
Pass-Through as an Economic Tool
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) analyze the social incidence of competition and the output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by considering the hypothetical entrance of exogenous quantity into a market. The formulas they use for this purpose, however, are correct only for marginal changes in exogenous quantity starting at zero or if demand functions are linear. We show how using the correct formulas changes Weyl and Fabinger's ana…
The ethics of online steering
Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Competition (biology (1 work) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (1 work) · Corporate Finance and Governance (1 work) · Cournot competition (1 work) · Digital Economy and Work Transformation (1 work) · Econometrics (1 work) · Economic Policies and Impacts (1 work)