Amanda Starc
Biographic Data
| ID | 5805841 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Amanda Starc |
| GIVEN NAMES | Amanda |
| FAMILY NAME | Starc |
| SIGNATURE | STARC A |
| AFFILIATIONS | California University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Getting the Price Right? The Impact of Competitive Bidding in the Medicare Program
We study Medicare’s competitive bidding program for durable medical equipment. We use Medicare claims data to examine the effect on prices and utilization, focusing on continuous positive airway pressure devices for sleep apnea. We find that spending falls by 47.2% after a highly imperfect bidding mechanism is introduced. This is almost entirely driven by a 44.8% price reduction, though quantities also fall by 4.3%. To disentangle supply and dema…
Inferring Risk Perceptions and Preferences Using Choice from Insurance Menus
Demand for insurance can be driven by high risk aversion or high-risk. We show how to separately identify risk preferences and risk types using only choices from menus of insurance plans. Our revealed preference approach does not rely on rational expectations, nor does it require access to claims data. We show what can be learned non-parametrically about the type distributions from variation in insurance plans, offered separately to random cross-…
Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange
We analyze insurance-pricing regulation under imperfect competition on the Massachusetts health insurance exchange. Differential markups lead to price variation apart from cost variation. Coarse insurer pricing strategies identify consumer demand. Younger consumers are twice as price sensitive as older consumers. Older consumers thus face higher markups over costs. Modified community rating links prices for consumers differing in both costs and p…
Designing and Regulating Health Insurance Exchanges
The Massachusetts health care reform provides preliminary evidence on the function of health insurance exchanges and individual insurance markets. This paper describes the type of products consumers choose and the dynamics of consumer choice. Evidence shows that choice architecture, including product standardization and the use of heuristics (rules of thumb), affects choice. In addition, while consumers often choose less generous plans in the exc…
Inferring Risk Perceptions and Preferences Using Choice from Insurance Menus
Demand for insurance can be driven by high risk aversion or high-risk. We show how to separately identify risk preferences and risk types using only choices from menus of insurance plans. Our revealed preference approach does not rely on rational expectations, nor does it require access to claims data. We show what can be learned non-parametrically about the type distributions from variation in insurance plans, offered separately to random cross-…
Designing and Regulating Health Insurance Exchanges
The Massachusetts health care reform provides preliminary evidence on the function of health insurance exchanges and individual insurance markets. This paper describes the type of products consumers choose and the dynamics of consumer choice. Evidence shows that choice architecture, including product standardization and the use of heuristics (rules of thumb), affects choice. In addition, while consumers often choose less generous plans in the exc…
Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange
We analyze insurance-pricing regulation under imperfect competition on the Massachusetts health insurance exchange. Differential markups lead to price variation apart from cost variation. Coarse insurer pricing strategies identify consumer demand. Younger consumers are twice as price sensitive as older consumers. Older consumers thus face higher markups over costs. Modified community rating links prices for consumers differing in both costs and p…
Inferring Risk Perceptions and Preferences Using Choice from Insurance Menus
Demand for insurance can be driven by high risk aversion or high-risk. We show how to separately identify risk preferences and risk types using only choices from menus of insurance plans. Our revealed preference approach does not rely on rational expectations, nor does it require access to claims data. We show what can be learned non-parametrically about the type distributions from variation in insurance plans, offered separately to random cross-…
Getting the Price Right? The Impact of Competitive Bidding in the Medicare Program
We study Medicare’s competitive bidding program for durable medical equipment. We use Medicare claims data to examine the effect on prices and utilization, focusing on continuous positive airway pressure devices for sleep apnea. We find that spending falls by 47.2% after a highly imperfect bidding mechanism is introduced. This is almost entirely driven by a 44.8% price reduction, though quantities also fall by 4.3%. To disentangle supply and dema…
Economics (4 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Global Health Care Issues (2 works) · Imperfect (2 works) · Imperfect competition (2 works) · Adverse selection (1 work)