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Gerald Willmann

Biographic Data

ID5806155
NAMEGerald Willmann
GIVEN NAMESGerald
FAMILY NAMEWillmann
SIGNATUREWILLMANN G
AFFILIATIONSBielefeld University & IfW Kiel, Germany
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS12
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1931
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX2
  • The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Agreements

    Open Access•Giovanni Facchini, Peri Silva et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    We develop a political economy model to study the decision of representative democracies to join a preferential trading agreement, distinguishing between free trade areas and customs unions. Our theoretical analysis shows that bilateral trade imbalances and income inequality are important factors determining the formation of preferential trading agreements, whereas the patterns of geographic specialisation explain whether a customs union or a fre…

  • Asylum seekers in Europe

    Open Access•Giovanni Facchini, Oliver Lorz et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2006•Cited by: 7•References: 1

  • On the endogenous allocation of decision powers in federal structures

    Open Access•Oliver Lorz, Gerald Willmann•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2005•Cited by: 4•References: 21

  • The International Aspect of the Missionary Movement in China

    G J Willmann, Gerald Willmann•ARTICLE•Thought•1931

  • Asylum seekers in Europe

    Open Access•Giovanni Facchini, Oliver Lorz et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2006•Cited by: 7•References: 1

  • On the endogenous allocation of decision powers in federal structures

    Open Access•Oliver Lorz, Gerald Willmann•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2005•Cited by: 4•References: 21

  • The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Agreements

    Open Access•Giovanni Facchini, Peri Silva et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    We develop a political economy model to study the decision of representative democracies to join a preferential trading agreement, distinguishing between free trade areas and customs unions. Our theoretical analysis shows that bilateral trade imbalances and income inequality are important factors determining the formation of preferential trading agreements, whereas the patterns of geographic specialisation explain whether a customs union or a fre…

  • The International Aspect of the Missionary Movement in China

    G J Willmann, Gerald Willmann•ARTICLE•Thought•1931

  • On the endogenous allocation of decision powers in federal structures

    Open Access•Oliver Lorz, Gerald Willmann•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2005•Cited by: 4•References: 21

  • Asylum seekers in Europe

    Open Access•Giovanni Facchini, Oliver Lorz et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2006•Cited by: 7•References: 1

  • The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Agreements

    Open Access•Giovanni Facchini, Peri Silva et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    We develop a political economy model to study the decision of representative democracies to join a preferential trading agreement, distinguishing between free trade areas and customs unions. Our theoretical analysis shows that bilateral trade imbalances and income inequality are important factors determining the formation of preferential trading agreements, whereas the patterns of geographic specialisation explain whether a customs union or a fre…

Political science (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Delegation (2 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · International economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work)

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