Arunava Sen
Biographic Data
| ID | 5806325 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Arunava Sen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Arunava |
| FAMILY NAME | Sen |
| SIGNATURE | SEN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indian Statistical Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1796-2623 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1972 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Priority domains
Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
Comparing Societies with Different Numbers of Individuals on the Basis of Their Average Advantage
Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
We consider strategyproof social choice functions defined over product domains. If preferences are strict orderings and separable, then strategyproof social choice functions must be decomposable provided that the domain of preferences is rich. We provide several characterization results in the case where preferences are separable only with respect to the elements of some partition of the set of components and these partitions vary across individu…
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Journal Article Pattanaik (P. K.). Voting and Collective ChoiceSen (A. K.). Collective Choice and Social Welfare Get access Collective Choice and Social Welfare. By A. K. Sen. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd; San Francisco: Holden-Day Inc., 1970. Pp. xii + 225. £3.50.)Voting and Collective Choice. By P. K. Pattanaik. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1971. Pp. viii + 184. £3.00.) Michael Taylor Michael Taylor University of Essex Search for other work…
No prominent works on this page.
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Journal Article Pattanaik (P. K.). Voting and Collective ChoiceSen (A. K.). Collective Choice and Social Welfare Get access Collective Choice and Social Welfare. By A. K. Sen. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd; San Francisco: Holden-Day Inc., 1970. Pp. xii + 225. £3.50.)Voting and Collective Choice. By P. K. Pattanaik. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1971. Pp. viii + 184. £3.00.) Michael Taylor Michael Taylor University of Essex Search for other work…
Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
We consider strategyproof social choice functions defined over product domains. If preferences are strict orderings and separable, then strategyproof social choice functions must be decomposable provided that the domain of preferences is rich. We provide several characterization results in the case where preferences are separable only with respect to the elements of some partition of the set of components and these partitions vary across individu…
Comparing Societies with Different Numbers of Individuals on the Basis of Their Average Advantage
The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
Priority domains
Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Social choice theory (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (2 works) · Sociology (2 works)