Costas Cavounidis
Biographic Data
| ID | 5806360 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Costas Cavounidis |
| GIVEN NAMES | Costas |
| FAMILY NAME | Cavounidis |
| SIGNATURE | CAVOUNIDIS C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Boss is Watching
African Americans face shorter employment durations than similar Whites. We hypothesise that employers discriminate in acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. In our model, monitoring Black, but not White, workers is self-sustaining. New Black hires were more likely fired by previous employers after monitoring. This reduces firms’ beliefs about ability, incentivising discriminatory monitoring. We confirm our predictions that layoffs …
Ben-Porath Meets Lazear
We provide microfoundations for dynamic skill formation with a model of investment in multiple skills, when jobs place different weights on skills. We show that credit constraints may affect investment even when workers do not exhaust their credit. Firms may invest in their workers’ skills even when there are many similar competitors. Firm and worker incentives can lead to overinvestment. Optimal skill accumulation resembles—but is not—learning b…
The Boss is Watching
African Americans face shorter employment durations than similar Whites. We hypothesise that employers discriminate in acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. In our model, monitoring Black, but not White, workers is self-sustaining. New Black hires were more likely fired by previous employers after monitoring. This reduces firms’ beliefs about ability, incentivising discriminatory monitoring. We confirm our predictions that layoffs …
Ben-Porath Meets Lazear
We provide microfoundations for dynamic skill formation with a model of investment in multiple skills, when jobs place different weights on skills. We show that credit constraints may affect investment even when workers do not exhaust their credit. Firms may invest in their workers’ skills even when there are many similar competitors. Firm and worker incentives can lead to overinvestment. Optimal skill accumulation resembles—but is not—learning b…
The Boss is Watching
African Americans face shorter employment durations than similar Whites. We hypothesise that employers discriminate in acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. In our model, monitoring Black, but not White, workers is self-sustaining. New Black hires were more likely fired by previous employers after monitoring. This reduces firms’ beliefs about ability, incentivising discriminatory monitoring. We confirm our predictions that layoffs …
Economics (2 works) · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality (2 works) · Labour economics (2 works) · Affect (linguistics (1 work) · Black male (1 work) · Boss (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Competitor analysis (1 work) · Demographic economics (1 work) · Economic growth (1 work)