Fausto Panunzi
Biographic Data
| ID | 5806529 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fausto Panunzi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fausto |
| FAMILY NAME | Panunzi |
| SIGNATURE | PANUNZI F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bocconi University, IGIER, Italy, CEPR, UK & ECGI , Belgium |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Economic Shocks and Populism
We study how voters’ preferences between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent change in the aftermath of a negative aggregate shock. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and are hence attracted by the more risky candidate. Survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are consistent with our assumptions and theoretical predictions on voters’ behaviour
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the posttakeover share value increases with the bidder's shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed so that the posttakeover share value matches …
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeov…
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeov…
Economic Shocks and Populism
We study how voters’ preferences between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent change in the aftermath of a negative aggregate shock. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and are hence attracted by the more risky candidate. Survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are consistent with our assumptions and theoretical predictions on voters’ behaviour
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeov…
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the posttakeover share value increases with the bidder's shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed so that the posttakeover share value matches …
Economic Shocks and Populism
We study how voters’ preferences between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent change in the aftermath of a negative aggregate shock. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and are hence attracted by the more risky candidate. Survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are consistent with our assumptions and theoretical predictions on voters’ behaviour
Economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Monetary economics (2 works) · Shareholder (2 works) · Adversary (1 work) · Agency (philosophy (1 work) · Aggregate (composite (1 work)