Gerard Llobet
Biographic Data
| ID | 5806638 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gerard Llobet |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gerard |
| FAMILY NAME | Llobet |
| SIGNATURE | LLOBET G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6421-5890 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Auctions with Privately Known Capacities
We study a multi-unit auction model in which bidders are privately informed about the maximum number of units they are willing to trade (which we refer to as ‘capacity’). No matter how big or small, private information on capacities changes the nature of the equilibrium as compared to when private information is on costs (or valuations). Also, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions are not revenue equivalent, in contrast to when costs are …
The simple economics of white elephants
Rewarding Sequential Innovators
This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation in which firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. Monopoly power is a scarce resource to be allocated across innovators who arrive at various times. The optimal assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future innovator…
Rewarding Sequential Innovators
This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation in which firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. Monopoly power is a scarce resource to be allocated across innovators who arrive at various times. The optimal assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future innovator…
Rewarding Sequential Innovators
This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation in which firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. Monopoly power is a scarce resource to be allocated across innovators who arrive at various times. The optimal assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future innovator…
The simple economics of white elephants
Auctions with Privately Known Capacities
We study a multi-unit auction model in which bidders are privately informed about the maximum number of units they are willing to trade (which we refer to as ‘capacity’). No matter how big or small, private information on capacities changes the nature of the equilibrium as compared to when private information is on costs (or valuations). Also, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions are not revenue equivalent, in contrast to when costs are …
Business (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Industrial organization (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Payment (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work)