Mathias Kifmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 5821468 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mathias Kifmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mathias |
| FAMILY NAME | Kifmann |
| SIGNATURE | KIFMANN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Konstanz |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8635-4528 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Diagnostics and Treatment
This paper analyzes the referral processes between a gatekeeping primary care physician (PCP) and a specialist. Specialists provide superior treatment for some patients but are more costly than PCPs. Agency problems arise because diagnostic signals are the private information of physicians. Welfare-optimizing contracts can call for a markup either to the PCP for treating patients without referral or to the specialist for referring patients back t…
The political sustainability of a basic income scheme and social health insurance
This paper studies within a two‐stage framework the political economy of a basic income (BI) and social health insurance (SHI) scheme. At the constitutional stage, individuals decide whether these schemes are implemented behind a veil of ignorance about their future income and risk type. This decision is made in anticipation of the outcome at the second stage in which individuals vote on the payroll tax to finance a BI and the contribution rate o…
Health insurance in a democracy
Health insurance in a democracy
The German Retirement Benefit Formula
We identify several objectionable features of the German retirement benefit formula. Groups of insureds with higher than average life expectancy are subsidized by the rest of the members because the formula neglects differences in group-specific life expectancy. Moreover, undesirable long-run effects arise if the earnings ceiling is raised or mandatory membership is extended, or if life expectancy rises or the rate of population growth declines. …
Insuring Premium Risk in Competitive Health Insurance Markets
How can it be avoided that consumers face premium risk, i.e. increases in their premiums when their health status deteriorates? Mathias Kifmann examines how this problem which is a major challenge for private health insurance markets can be solved. Three principal ways to insure premium risk which preserve competition among health insurers are analyzed and compared. Guaranteed renewable contracts ensure premiums independent of changes in the heal…
Smoothing the Implicit Tax Rate in a Pay-as-you-go Pension System
In this paper, we analyze how the implicit tax rate can be smoothed in a pay-as-you-go system if life expectancy increases or if the rate of population growth declines. We show that generation-specific contribution or replacement rates are necessary to smooth the implicit tax rate. Partial funding of the pension system is indispensable if the rate of population growth falls. If life expectancy increases, the contribution rate fluctuates and may n…
Private Health Insurance in Chile
A private health insurance system has existed in Chile since 1981 and has covered over a quarter of the population of that country since 1995. This article examines that system in economic terms. The analysis focuses on the incentive effects of state regulations governing the formulation of private health insurance policies and the relationship with the state health service. The imbalance in policy termination rights and the unrestricted possibil…
Health insurance in a democracy
Private Health Insurance in Chile
A private health insurance system has existed in Chile since 1981 and has covered over a quarter of the population of that country since 1995. This article examines that system in economic terms. The analysis focuses on the incentive effects of state regulations governing the formulation of private health insurance policies and the relationship with the state health service. The imbalance in policy termination rights and the unrestricted possibil…
Private Health Insurance in Chile
A private health insurance system has existed in Chile since 1981 and has covered over a quarter of the population of that country since 1995. This article examines that system in economic terms. The analysis focuses on the incentive effects of state regulations governing the formulation of private health insurance policies and the relationship with the state health service. The imbalance in policy termination rights and the unrestricted possibil…
Smoothing the Implicit Tax Rate in a Pay-as-you-go Pension System
In this paper, we analyze how the implicit tax rate can be smoothed in a pay-as-you-go system if life expectancy increases or if the rate of population growth declines. We show that generation-specific contribution or replacement rates are necessary to smooth the implicit tax rate. Partial funding of the pension system is indispensable if the rate of population growth falls. If life expectancy increases, the contribution rate fluctuates and may n…
Insuring Premium Risk in Competitive Health Insurance Markets
How can it be avoided that consumers face premium risk, i.e. increases in their premiums when their health status deteriorates? Mathias Kifmann examines how this problem which is a major challenge for private health insurance markets can be solved. Three principal ways to insure premium risk which preserve competition among health insurers are analyzed and compared. Guaranteed renewable contracts ensure premiums independent of changes in the heal…
The German Retirement Benefit Formula
We identify several objectionable features of the German retirement benefit formula. Groups of insureds with higher than average life expectancy are subsidized by the rest of the members because the formula neglects differences in group-specific life expectancy. Moreover, undesirable long-run effects arise if the earnings ceiling is raised or mandatory membership is extended, or if life expectancy rises or the rate of population growth declines. …
Health insurance in a democracy
Health insurance in a democracy
The political sustainability of a basic income scheme and social health insurance
This paper studies within a two‐stage framework the political economy of a basic income (BI) and social health insurance (SHI) scheme. At the constitutional stage, individuals decide whether these schemes are implemented behind a veil of ignorance about their future income and risk type. This decision is made in anticipation of the outcome at the second stage in which individuals vote on the payroll tax to finance a BI and the contribution rate o…
Diagnostics and Treatment
This paper analyzes the referral processes between a gatekeeping primary care physician (PCP) and a specialist. Specialists provide superior treatment for some patients but are more costly than PCPs. Agency problems arise because diagnostic signals are the private information of physicians. Welfare-optimizing contracts can call for a markup either to the PCP for treating patients without referral or to the specialist for referring patients back t…
Economics (7 works) · Actuarial science (4 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Economic growth (3 works) · Global Health Care Issues (3 works) · Health care (3 works) · Health insurance (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Public economics (3 works)