Sherrilyn Roush
Biographic Data
| ID | 5825483 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sherrilyn Roush |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sherrilyn |
| FAMILY NAME | Roush |
| SIGNATURE | ROUSH S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2000-9331 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The epistemic superiority of experiment to simulation
This paper defends the naïve thesis that the method of experiment has per se an epistemic superiority over the method of computer simulation, a view that has been rejected by some philosophers writing about simulation, and whose grounds have been hard to pin down by its defenders. I further argue that this superiority does not come from the experiment’s object being materially similar to the target in the world that the investigator is trying to …
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs
There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first…
Replies
Précis of Tracking Truth
Tracking Truth
This book develops and defends a new externalist, reliabilist theory of knowledge and evidence, and develops a new view about scientific realism. Knowledge is viewed as a tracking theory that has a conditional probability rather than counterfactual formulation, and the property of closure under known implication is imposed on knowledge. It is argued that the tracking theory of evidence is best formulated and defended as a confirmation theory base…
Testability and Candor
Discussion Note
This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is redundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left without mo…
Copernicus, Kant, and the anthropic cosmological principles
The Comprehensibility of the Universe
During the last century or so, natural science has met with astonishing success in increasing our knowledge and understanding of the natural world.Science has, it seems, made progress at an ever-accelerating rate.The question arises: What has been responsible for this progressive success of science?Before the birth of modern science, with the work of Galileo, Kepler and others in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, knowledge grew in a rather…
The Comprehensibility of the Universe
The epistemic superiority of experiment to simulation
This paper defends the naïve thesis that the method of experiment has per se an epistemic superiority over the method of computer simulation, a view that has been rejected by some philosophers writing about simulation, and whose grounds have been hard to pin down by its defenders. I further argue that this superiority does not come from the experiment’s object being materially similar to the target in the world that the investigator is trying to …
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs
There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first…
Discussion Note
This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is redundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left without mo…
The Comprehensibility of the Universe
During the last century or so, natural science has met with astonishing success in increasing our knowledge and understanding of the natural world.Science has, it seems, made progress at an ever-accelerating rate.The question arises: What has been responsible for this progressive success of science?Before the birth of modern science, with the work of Galileo, Kepler and others in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, knowledge grew in a rather…
The Comprehensibility of the Universe
Copernicus, Kant, and the anthropic cosmological principles
Discussion Note
This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is redundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left without mo…
Tracking Truth
This book develops and defends a new externalist, reliabilist theory of knowledge and evidence, and develops a new view about scientific realism. Knowledge is viewed as a tracking theory that has a conditional probability rather than counterfactual formulation, and the property of closure under known implication is imposed on knowledge. It is argued that the tracking theory of evidence is best formulated and defended as a confirmation theory base…
Testability and Candor
Replies
Précis of Tracking Truth
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs
There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first…
The epistemic superiority of experiment to simulation
This paper defends the naïve thesis that the method of experiment has per se an epistemic superiority over the method of computer simulation, a view that has been rejected by some philosophers writing about simulation, and whose grounds have been hard to pin down by its defenders. I further argue that this superiority does not come from the experiment’s object being materially similar to the target in the world that the investigator is trying to …
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Physics (3 works) · Universe (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Astronomy (2 works)