Lars Stole
Biographic Data
| ID | 5848744 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lars Stole |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lars |
| FAMILY NAME | Stole |
| SIGNATURE | STOLE L |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be upper semicontinuous in the control variable. We apply those conditions to economic environments in contract theory where discontinuities in objectives prevail. Examples of applications include nonlinear pricing…
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria include those with non-differentiable payoffs and di…
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breach. Private enforcement comes from severing relationships. We first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly. Whether a long-term co…
Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information
Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Linear State, Semicontinuous Lagrangians
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games
We study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals (sellers) affects market participation by a privately informed agent (consumer). When participation is restricted to all or nothing (“intrinsic” agency), the agent must choose between both principals' contracts and selecting her outside option. When the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract (“delegated” agency), competition is more intense.…
Selecting equilibria in common agency games
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers
This paper examines individual decision making when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn. The authors address this problem in the context of a manager making investment decisions on a project over time. They show that, in an effort to appear as a fast learner, the manager will exaggerate his own information but ultimately he becomes too conservative, being unwilling to change his investments on the basis of new information. The authors'…
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers
This paper examines individual decision making when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn. The authors address this problem in the context of a manager making investment decisions on a project over time. They show that, in an effort to appear as a fast learner, the manager will exaggerate his own information but ultimately he becomes too conservative, being unwilling to change his investments on the basis of new information. The authors'…
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers
This paper examines individual decision making when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn. The authors address this problem in the context of a manager making investment decisions on a project over time. They show that, in an effort to appear as a fast learner, the manager will exaggerate his own information but ultimately he becomes too conservative, being unwilling to change his investments on the basis of new information. The authors'…
Selecting equilibria in common agency games
Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games
We study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals (sellers) affects market participation by a privately informed agent (consumer). When participation is restricted to all or nothing (“intrinsic” agency), the agent must choose between both principals' contracts and selecting her outside option. When the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract (“delegated” agency), competition is more intense.…
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Linear State, Semicontinuous Lagrangians
Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breach. Private enforcement comes from severing relationships. We first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly. Whether a long-term co…
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria include those with non-differentiable payoffs and di…
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be upper semicontinuous in the control variable. We apply those conditions to economic environments in contract theory where discontinuities in objectives prevail. Examples of applications include nonlinear pricing…
Economics (11 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Microeconomics (9 works) · Business (7 works) · Economic theories and models (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Game Theory and Applications (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works)