Denis Gromb
Biographic Data
| ID | 5849059 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Denis Gromb |
| GIVEN NAMES | Denis |
| FAMILY NAME | Gromb |
| SIGNATURE | GROMB D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Economic Policy Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0792-0566 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice
A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e ., within an implementability cone . The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information‐collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed …
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the posttakeover share value increases with the bidder's shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed so that the posttakeover share value matches …
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeov…
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeov…
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeov…
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the posttakeover share value increases with the bidder's shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed so that the posttakeover share value matches …
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice
A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e ., within an implementability cone . The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information‐collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed …
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (3 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Computer security (2 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Finance (2 works)