Ernst‐Ludwig von Thadden
Biographic Data
| ID | 5850018 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ernst‐Ludwig von Thadden |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ernst‐Ludwig |
| FAMILY NAME | von Thadden |
| SIGNATURE | VON THADDEN E L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Mannheim |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Corporate Governance and the Distribution of Wealth
We present a theory in which the corporate governance structure in a country is determined by a political majority and show how this decision is related to the distribution of financial wealth. The main argument is that labor claims are exposed to undiversifiable risk, so voters with small financial stakes may prefer a corporate governance structure that reduces corporate risktaking. We discuss the inflationary experiences of different countries …
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the "great reversal" phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several …
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the "great reversal" phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several …
Corporate Governance and the Distribution of Wealth
We present a theory in which the corporate governance structure in a country is determined by a political majority and show how this decision is related to the distribution of financial wealth. The main argument is that labor claims are exposed to undiversifiable risk, so voters with small financial stakes may prefer a corporate governance structure that reduces corporate risktaking. We discuss the inflationary experiences of different countries …
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the "great reversal" phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several …
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (2 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Economic system (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (2 works) · Market economy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works)