Andrzej Skrzypacz
Biographic Data
| ID | 5850815 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrzej Skrzypacz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrzej |
| FAMILY NAME | Skrzypacz |
| SIGNATURE | SKRZYPACZ A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stanford University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Persuasion with Multiple Actions
Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands
Yuliy Sannikov
Yuliy Sannikov is an extraordinary theorist who has developed methods that offer new insights in analyzing problems that had seemed well-studied and familiar: for example, decisions that might bring about cooperation and/or defection in a repeated-play prisoner's dilemma game, or that affect the balance of incentives and opportunism in a principal–agent relationship. His work has broken new ground in methodology, often through the application of …
Selling Information
A firm considers hiring an agent who may be competent for a potential project or not. The agent can prove her competence but faces a holdup problem. We propose a model of persuasion and show how gradualism helps mitigate the holdup problem. We show when it is optimal to give away part of the information at the beginning of the bargaining and sell the remainder in dribs and drabs. The agent can appropriate only part of the value of information. In…
Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers
A seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline, for example, the end of a season. Potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases. Each period, the profit-maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs. We show that these cutoffs are deterministic, depending only on the inventory and time remaining; in the continuous-time limit, the optimal mechanism ca…
Selling Information
A firm considers hiring an agent who may be competent for a potential project or not. The agent can prove her competence but faces a holdup problem. We propose a model of persuasion and show how gradualism helps mitigate the holdup problem. We show when it is optimal to give away part of the information at the beginning of the bargaining and sell the remainder in dribs and drabs. The agent can appropriate only part of the value of information. In…
Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers
A seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline, for example, the end of a season. Potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases. Each period, the profit-maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs. We show that these cutoffs are deterministic, depending only on the inventory and time remaining; in the continuous-time limit, the optimal mechanism ca…
Selling Information
A firm considers hiring an agent who may be competent for a potential project or not. The agent can prove her competence but faces a holdup problem. We propose a model of persuasion and show how gradualism helps mitigate the holdup problem. We show when it is optimal to give away part of the information at the beginning of the bargaining and sell the remainder in dribs and drabs. The agent can appropriate only part of the value of information. In…
Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers
A seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline, for example, the end of a season. Potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases. Each period, the profit-maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs. We show that these cutoffs are deterministic, depending only on the inventory and time remaining; in the continuous-time limit, the optimal mechanism ca…
Yuliy Sannikov
Yuliy Sannikov is an extraordinary theorist who has developed methods that offer new insights in analyzing problems that had seemed well-studied and familiar: for example, decisions that might bring about cooperation and/or defection in a repeated-play prisoner's dilemma game, or that affect the balance of incentives and opportunism in a principal–agent relationship. His work has broken new ground in methodology, often through the application of …
Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands
Persuasion with Multiple Actions
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Computer security (2 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (2 works)