Mitchell A Petersen
Biographic Data
| ID | 5852162 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mitchell A Petersen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mitchell A |
| FAMILY NAME | Petersen |
| SIGNATURE | PETERSEN M A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University |
| ORCID | 0009-0008-8271-5822 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
In corporate finance and asset pricing empirical work, researchers are often confronted with panel data. In these data sets, the residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Historically, researchers in the two literatures have used different solutions to this problem. This paper examines the different methods used in the literature and explains when the different methods yield the same (and corr…
Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks
Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks
Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence
Firms may be financed by their suppliers rather than by financial institutions. There are many theories of trade credit, but few comprehensive empirical tests. This article attempts to fill the gap. We focus on small firms whose access to capital markets may be limited and find evidence suggesting that firms use more trade credit when credit from financial institutions is unavailable. Suppliers lend to constrained firms because they have a compar…
The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships
This paper provides a simple framework showing that the extent of competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely to finance credit-constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The paper offers evidence from small business data in support of this hypothesis.
No prominent works on this page.
The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships
This paper provides a simple framework showing that the extent of competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely to finance credit-constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The paper offers evidence from small business data in support of this hypothesis.
Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence
Firms may be financed by their suppliers rather than by financial institutions. There are many theories of trade credit, but few comprehensive empirical tests. This article attempts to fill the gap. We focus on small firms whose access to capital markets may be limited and find evidence suggesting that firms use more trade credit when credit from financial institutions is unavailable. Suppliers lend to constrained firms because they have a compar…
Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks
Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
In corporate finance and asset pricing empirical work, researchers are often confronted with panel data. In these data sets, the residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Historically, researchers in the two literatures have used different solutions to this problem. This paper examines the different methods used in the literature and explains when the different methods yield the same (and corr…
Corporate Finance and Governance (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (3 works) · Business (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Monetary economics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Credit enhancement (2 works) · Credit history (2 works) · Credit reference (2 works)