Emanuele Colonnelli
Biographic Data
| ID | 5853562 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Emanuele Colonnelli |
| GIVEN NAMES | Emanuele |
| FAMILY NAME | Colonnelli |
| SIGNATURE | COLONNELLI E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Economic Research Centre |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Investing with the Government
We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decisio…
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connect…
Investing with the Government
We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decisio…
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connect…
Investing with the Government
We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decisio…
Economics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Bureaucracy (1 work) · Business (1 work) · China (1 work) · Competence (human resources) (1 work) · Complementarity (molecular biology (1 work) · Corruption and Economic Development (1 work) · Discretion (1 work)